An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insurance for Many Kinds of Injuries by O\u27Connell, Jeffrey




An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability:
Elective No-Fault Insurance for Many Kinds of
Injuries
Jeffrey O'Connell
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
O'Connell, Jeffrey, "An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insurance for Many Kinds of Injuries" (1976).
Minnesota Law Review. 1596.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1596
An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability:
Elective No-Fault Insurance for Many Kinds
of Injuriest
Jeffrey O'Connell*
' The inadequacies of tort liability as it applies to personal
injury have become commonplace knowledge in recent years.
David Sandford's incisive summary of the present system's un-
wieldy mixture of insurance, law, technology, and emotion-
largely leading to frustration-is as follows:
Newspapers in March [1975] reported the sad story of Gail
Kalmowitz, a nearly blind college student, who had undertaken
to sue for negligence two doctors and the hospital where she had
been born prematurely. She asserted that the defendants' fail-
ure to provide her adequate care following her birth in 1953 had
caused her loss of sight. While the jury in her case was deciding
its verdict, she became anxious about the outcome and accepted
a $165,000 settlement offered her by the defendants' insurance
company. A few minutes later the jury returned and she
learned that had she not settled she would have won $900,000.
Was she a fool?
The insurance company evidently expected a big verdict in
her favor, but Miss Kanowitz was merely playing the odds.
* . [After all] the majority of plaintiffs in malpractice . . .
suits end up with nothing. Moreover, even if Miss Kalmowitz
had waited for the jury, the defendants could have appealed and
might, after years and expense to her, have won a reversal.
Miss Kahnowitz chose a sure thing and that may not have been
a mistake.[']
t This Article is part of a study by the author financed by the
John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation; Consumers Union; the
Foundation for Insurance Research, Study and Training (FIRST) of the
League Insurance Group, Southfield, Michigan; and the Center for Ad-
vanced Study, University of Illinois.
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
1. For an excellent description of the frustrations to doctors from
a case like Kalmowitz, see N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1975, at 1, cols. 2-3. They
are summarized in the following letter to the editors of Newsweek:
[The case of] ... Gail Kalmowitz... is a classic example
of the malpractice malaise threatening the health professions.
Two physicians, practicing medicine according to the then cur-
rent standards of care, preserve the life of a premature infant,
who later becomes blind as a consequence of the high oxygen
concentration that made her very survival possible. Twenty-
two years later, the physicians are held retroactively account-
able to a different and changing standard.
When it was discovered that the eyes of some infants were
more sensitive than others to high oxygen concentrations, there
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Ideally, an inept or careless physician should be made to pay
the costs of the damage he does; likewise the manufacturer of
a faulty or dangerous consumer prcduct. Guilt should be fixed
and punished and the fellow who makes the shabby power tool
that ends up putting out someone's eyes should have to pay for
the doctors, for the loss of a career, and for the lifetime support
of the blinded consumer. "Ideally" is the key word, of course,
because retribution is an inexact science. Some products are in-
herently hazardous-a chain saw for example-and if the user
saws off his arm is it because the machine was faulty and the
user was not warned of the peril, or is it because the victim op-
erated the saw carelessly and in flagrant disregard of its operat-
ing features and instructions?
Nor is this common ambiguity the only problem. Whatever
the circumstances of an accident, the lawyers for the contending,
parties, in our adversary system of laws, will arrive in court pre-
pared to present, as theatrically &3 a judge will tolerate, the
"best" case for their clients. Extraneous matters are introduced
into proceedings to sway jury verdicts. Indeed, lawyers try dur-
ing the empaneling of juries to select persons who, by dint of
certain stereotypes, are likely to be more-or less-inclined to
find in favor of one party or the other. A plaintiff's lawyer
might prefer jurors who are young, or Jewish, or black, or who
work in blue-collar jobs, and who are presumed to be generous
in their impulses toward the injured. The lawyer representing
the doctor accused of malpractice is likely to want on the jury
retired persons living on fixed incomes and "tight with a buck,"
middle-management types, or a highly diverse group liable to
squabble and unlikely to grant a large award.
Once a trial is underway the p3laintiff and the defendant,
each in his own ways, will try to win the sympathies of jurors
with irrelevancies. The blind plaintiff might be encouraged to
come to court with his seeing-eye dog and to dab at his eyes
with a handkerchief. The corporation's lawyer might dress
shabbily and play the rube and sit in court next to a "goat"-
[an] ... official of the sued company who, it is heavily implied,
will personally suffer an adverse verdict [whereas in fact an in-
surer will almost always pay any verdict]. 2 ] On the defense side
was a concerted effort to lower oxygen concentrations in incuba-
tors to what were then considered less toxic levels. Predictably,
there was a drop in the incidence of retrolental fibroplasia.
Ironically, however, recent evidence in the United States, Eng-
land and elsewhere now indicates that lowering oxygen concen-
tration to prevent the rare occurrence of blindness has been ac-
complished at the cost of an increase in mental retardation of
oxygen-deprived premature infants. It could be argued that
Miss Kalmowitz might have grown up retarded instead of blind
-had she in fact survived at all without the extra oxygen. This
is a hard dilemma, but one we must face daily in our imperfect
world. We can't have it both ways, and the burdens of choice
are not eased by having to second-guess what interpretations
will be placed on our actions by an emotion-charged jury twenty
years after the fact.
Letter from Joseph Leaser, M.D., Hershey, Pa., in NwsVwnEx, May 12,
1975, at 4, 6, quoted in Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Con-
tract, 1976 A.B.F. Rs. J. 87, 114-15 n.54.
2. Cf. James & Law, Compensation for Auto Accident Victims:
A Story of Too Little and Too Late, 26 CONN. B.J. 70, 78-79 (1952).
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there will be expensive technical experts offering abstruse testi-
mony that the product at issue was not unreasonably dangerous,
that it was not the product but something else that caused the
injury, that the product was not defective when sold, that the
injured person had been negligent in the maintenance or use of
the product, that the manufacturer had amply warned of the
hazards involved, and so forth.
The injured plaintiff in these cases is allowed to sue not only
to recover the actual expenses incurred as a result of his acci-
dent-medical bills, lost wages, etc.-but for intangible pain and
suffering. Thus a judgment can run into the hundreds of
thousands of dollars or more, and the lawyer for the plaintiff,
working on a contingency-fee basis, will collect a percentage,
usually a third, of the money won in court. Doctors, particu-
larly, are quick to argue that one of the reasons there are so
many malpractice suits is that aggrieved patients are egged on
by attorneys hoping to get rich. A third of a million dollars
is quite a ... fee. Product liability suits and malpractice cases
do seem to reward lawyers generously ....
Whatever the virtues of the fault system and of law suits,
it remains true, according to . . . the National Product Safety
Commission, that "most injuries to consumers go uncompen-
sated." . . . Trials are expensive, and it's not worth a lawyer's
while to sue for damages of less than $5,000 or $10,000. Perhaps
two-thirds of those injured never pursue a claim beyond writing
an unacknowledged letter to the firm whose product was in-
volved in an accident.
The problem is immense. The Product Safety Commission
estimates that 20-million people in the United States are injured
each year "as a result of accidents connected with consumer
products." These are, quite frequently, architectural glass, color
television sets, fireworks, floor furnaces, glass bottles, bicycles,
hot water vaporizers, household chemicals, infant furniture, lad-
ders, power tools, lawnmowers, toys, gas heaters. There are
perhaps 500,000 product liability cases in the courts each year.
Medical malpractice suits are even more of a problem, given
the near impossibility of proving negligence and the reticence
of doctors to testify against one another. Malpractice is a night-
mare to doctors as well as to patient litigants: a doctor may
resort to expensive and needless procedures (for instance, X-
rays) only to establish later in court, if need be, that he had
done everything he could to diagnose and treat illness. Insur-
ance companies want to get out of the malpractice business; they
say it isn't profitable. Doctors are carping about malpractice in-
surance rates, now commonly as high as $12,000 or more a year
for a physician .... 3
Some idea of the waste the tort liability insurance system
generates is gained by examining just how much of the premium
dollar ever reaches accident victims. While defenders of tort
3. Sanford, Book Review, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1975, § 7, at 4, cols.
1-4 (summarizing the first three chapters of J. O'CoNNELL, ENDnN IN-




liability seem always to be offended by appraisals of the system
from this vantage,4 surely the thrust of even the common law
has been to recognize increasingly the rights of accident victims
to share in tort liability insurance proceeds.5
Professor Robert Keeton of the Harvard Law School has
compiled the following table:
Where the Automobile Bodily Injury Liability Insurance
Premium Dollar Goes 6
General Overheard[7] 33 cents
Claims Administration Cost
Defense Side[8 ] 13 cents
Claimants' Side19J 10 cents
4. See, e.g., Kalven, A Schema of Alternatives to the Present Auto
Accident Tort System, 1 CONN. L. REV. 33, 34-35 (1968).
5. See, e.g., R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAw-BAsic TEXT 223-28, 522-
27 (1971); J. O'CoNN-LL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF No-
FAULT INSURANCE 22 (1971).
6. From P. KEETON & R. KEErox, TORTS: CASES AND MATEIALS
514 (1971) (footnotes renumbered).
The principal sources of data relied upon in making this
computation are the following: the American Insurance As-
sociation [AIA]Cost Study [AIA, SPECIAL Comnvr. TO STUDY AND
EVALUATE THE KCEEToN-O'CoNNELL BASIC PROTECTION PLAN AND
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS, REPORT 13-16 (1968)] ... ;
the Michigan Study of Conard and his colleagues [A. CONARD,
J. MORGAN, R. PRATT, C. VOLTZ, & R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTs-SUDIES 3n THE EcoNoMIcs or
INruny REPARATIoN (1964)]... ; Harwayne, Automobile Basic
Protection Costs Evaluated (1968); and Harwayne, Insurance
Costs of Basic Protection Plan in Michigan, 1967 U. Ill. L. Forum
479 (1967), also published in Crisis in Car Insurance 119 [(R.
Keeton, J. O'Connell, & J. McCord eds. 1968)]. Harwayne is a
Fellow of the Casualty Actuarial Society and an independent
consulting actuary. His studies were conducted under the
sponsorship of the Automobile Claims Study at Harvard Law
School, in which the Basic Protection Plan was developed.
The calculations presented here were published in a 1969
pamphlet, under the same title as this chapter. [Compensation
Systems-The Search for a Viable Alternative to Negligence
Law]. They were thereafter cited and independently confirmed
in N.Y. Ins. Dep't Report 34-37 (1970).
Id. at 513 n.17.
7. General overhead, as used here, refers to all overhead other
than claims administration costs. :t includes agents' fees and
other marketing costs (variously referred to in the insurance in-
dustry as production or acquisition costs), home office expenses,
taxes, and profit. ... Harwayne's study sustains the estimate,
used in this chart, that actual general overhead comes to 33 cents
of the premium dollar.
Id. at 514 n.18.
8. Harwayne observes that in recent years national stock com-
pany averages for defense claim costs have varied from 12.8 to
13.3 per cent and national mutual company averages from 16.2
to 16.6. The chart presented here uses a figure of 13 cents as
a very conservative figure for the industry as a whole on a na-
tional basis.
Id. n.19.





Total Overheard 56 cents
Net Amount Paid to Victims
Above Losses (in theory for
Pain and Suffering) [10] 21.5 cents
Paid to Compensate for Losses
Also Compensated from Other
Sources (including income
tax saving) [n] 8 cents
Conard and his colleagues at the University of Michigan-show
these costs to be about 10 cents of the premium dollar. This
figure is used in the chart. It is, of course, an average for all
claimants-representing a mean between lower claims costs for
those without attorneys and higher claims costs for those with
attorneys, who also generally receive higher total payments.
These claims costs on the claimants' side are paid out of
the gross sum the insurance companies pay to settle claims,
whether paid before or after a trial. Under the AIA figures that
amount is 55 cents; under the adjusted figures used in this chart,
54 cents.
Id. at 514-15 n.20.
10. The AIA study found that the total -amount paid in settle-
ment of a bodily injury claim under the tort liability system
is on the average 2.4 times the amount of economic loss.
When we divide 2.4 into 54 cents of gross payment for
claims, we find that 22.5 cents go to compensation for economic
losses of those victims to whom payments are made. Deducting
this 22.5 cents and the 10 cents for claimants' attorneys from
the total of 54 cents, we find that 21.5 cents go to compensation
above both economic loss and attorneys' fees.
In theory this is compensation for pain and suffering, though
it is not all that is paid on this theory. That is, at least part
of the amount that goes to pay claimants' attorneys' fees (the
10-cent figure) can also be said to have been awarded on the
theory of damages for pain and suffering, since claimants are
not entitled to recover compensation for their attorneys' fees as
such.
Id. at 515 n.21.
11. The AIA report shows that other available sources of com-
pensation such as Blue Cross, Blue Shield, accident and health
coverage, and the like amount to at least 11 per cent of the total
tort recoveries. That is, this is the amount they found in dupli-
cated payments. This would amount to 6 cents of the premium
dollar (11 per cent of 54 cents).
The Harwayne study calls attention to the fact that the AIA
study obtained from claimants themselves the data reported as
compensation from other sources than automobile liability insur-
ance. It seems likely indeed that data collected in this way
would not reflect the full extent of other payments. Moreover,
such data do not reflect the overlapping of compensation that
results from the fact that a claimant is excused from paying in-
come tax on the compensation he receives for the amount of
wages lost, on which he would have had to pay a tax if he had
received that amount as wages.
A figure of 8 cents seems a very conservative estimate of
overlapping compensation (including the income tax saving),
and this figure is used in the chart.
For 1969, and even more so as to later years, this figure
of 8 cents is a conservatively low estimate of overlapping com-
pensation for another reason beyond those so far stated-pay-
ments of compensation from sources other than liability insur-
1976]
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Paid to Compensate for Losses
Not Compensated from Other
Sources[12] 14.5 cents
Net Paid to Victims Altogether 44 cents
100 cents
Genuine dollar losses are what most people want to insure
against. Apart from tort liability insurance, there is no market
for pain and suffering coverage in 'insurance that people buy on
themselves. As Professor Alfred Conard of the University of
Michigan Law School has put it:
Did you ever hear of anyone voluntarily buying insurance
against pain and suffering? Everybody I know would rather
keep his premium money and bear his suffering without balm.
If no one in his right mind would voluntarily buy insurance
against pain and suffering, it is silly to require everyone to buy
it compulsorily.'3
Yet only 14.5 cents of the automobile tort liability insurance dol-
lar goes to meet that essential insurance need of payment for
dollar losses not otherwise compensated. 1 4
Similar inadequacy is found in compensating injury in at
least two other situations-personal injury from medical mal-
practice and from defective products.
Extrapolating (conservatively) the auto liability and other
figures' 5 to medical malpractice, we get the following figures:
Hypothesis of Where the Medical Malpractice
Liability Insurance Preirdum Dollar Goes
General Overhead16  30 cents
ance have been rising rapidly, and the trend is expected to con-
tinue.
Id. n.22.
12. This figure-showing the amount paid in compensation for
losses not compensated from other sources-is derived simply
by subtraction. After accounting for other purposes to which
all the rest of the premium dollar is committed, we find that
only 14Y cents go to compensating for losses not otherwise
compensated.
Id. n.23.
13. Conard, Insurance Rates and Regulation, 15 U. MicH. L. QuAD.
NoTEs, Fall 1970, at 14. But see J. O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at 104-
05; J. O'CONNELL & R. SIMON, PAYMENT FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING 29-34
(1972), also printed in O'Connell & Simon, Payment for Pain & Suffer-
ing: Who Wants What, When & Why?, 1972 U. IL. L.F. 1, 29-34.
14. J. O'CoNNELL, supra note 5, at 36; note 12 supra and accom-
panying text.
15. See note 16 infra.
16. This figure is based on those provided by insurers to Insurance
Services Offices (ISO). ISO is a statistical and rating body organized
by property and casualty insurers. The insurance industry figures were
submitted to the Subcommittee on Health of the Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare, chaired by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, in
[Vol. 60:501
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Claims Administration Cost17
Defense Side 24 cents
Claimants Side 18 cents
Total Claims Administration
Cost 42 cents
response to written interrogatories from the Subcommittee. Washington
Insurance Newsletter, Dec. 8, 1975, at 7 [hereinafter cited as Newsletter].
According to another estimate for medical malpractice insurance, "Ap-
proximately 25 percent of a physician's malpractice insurance premium
. . . is consumed by the . .. insurer [exclusive of legal fees]." Note,
Comparative Approaches to Liability for Medical Maloccurrences, 84
YALE L.J. 1141, 1155 (1975) (citing Remarks of G. Parrella, Medical Mal-
practice Insurance, Connecticut Medical Society House of Delegates, Nov.
20, 1974; on file with the Yale Law Journal). But that same estimate
is much higher for legal fees: "An additional estimated 50 percent of
the premium is consumed by lawyers in the form of fees for services
in medical litigation." Id. For a similar estimate of "more than 50 cents"
of the insurance dollar going to lawyers, "less than 25 cents" to patients,
and the remainder to insurers' expenses, see PHYSICIANS CRISIS COMMIT-
TEE [OF DETROIT], COURT DoCm= SURVEY 2 (1975).
17. The figure of 24 cents for costs of administering defense claims
is the response of the insurance industry to one of the Kennedy Subcom-
mittee questions. Newsletter, supra note 16, at 7.
Medical malpractice cases (like product liability cases) are much
more difficult to prepare and try for both plaintiff and defense lawyers,
so that it is safe to assume more is spent on legal fees by both sides
for medical malpractice claims than for automobile liability claims.
J. O'CoNNELL, ENDING INSULT To INJURY: NO-FAULT INSURANCE FOR
PRODUCTS Am SEmvIcEs 29-30, 41 (1975) [hereinafter cited as J. O'CON-
NELL]. Also given their complexity, it is much more likely that a claim-
ant in a medical malpractice or product liability case will retain a law-
yer. Admittedly, estimates vary widely:
One insurance company told the subcommittee [of the Sen-
ate Committee on Government Operations] that of the total
[loss] costs from its malpractice business, only 30 percent of
these funds actually go the patient; 15 percent goes to the plain-
tiff's attorney; and 55 percent is taken by defense attorney fees
and defense investigation costs.
Another said that 38 percent of each claims loss goes to the
patient; 35 percent goes to the plaintiff's attorney; and 27 per-
cent is taken by defense attorney fees and defense investigation
costs.
It is readily apparent, then, that the amount of claims andjudgments paid represent only a portion of the costs generated
by malpractice actions. Furthermore, the lion's share of the ex-
pense goes to the legal community.
SuBcOcm . ON EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATON OF THE SENATE COm. ox Gov-
ENMENT OPERATIONS, 91ST CONG., IST SESS., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE
PATIENT vERsus = PHYSIcIAN 10 (Comm. Print 1970).
Without certainty about whether plaintiff's or defendant's coun-
sel ends up with a different ratio of the total money going to counsel
fees in medical malpractice liability insurance as opposed to automobile
liability insurance, I have assumed the same ratio (13:23 = 24:42;
10:23 = 18:42). See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra. Actually, given
the greater resistance to medical malpractice claims compared to auto
liability claims, see J. O'CONNELL, supra at 29-30, it might be safe
to assume defense lawyers receive even more of the premium dollar
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Total Overhead1S 72 cents
Net Amount Paid to Victims
Above Losses (in theory for
Pain and Suffering)19  8.8 cents
vis-A-vis plaintiff's lawyers. Note that the total figure of 42 cents
roughly corresponds with the estimate in a generally astute appraisal
of medical malpractice insurance by journalists Stephen Cain and Clark
Hallas: "For every dollar collected by a patient who successfully sues
a doctor or hospital for medical malpractice, the attorneys representing
both sides of the suit collect an estimated $2." Cain & Hallas, Possibility
of Fraud Is Probed in Medical Malpractice Suits, Detroit News, Oct. 10,
1974, at 1, cols. 2-4 (which. for the purposes of this Article, involved
a comparison of the figures for claims administration cost for both the
defense side and the claimants' side and for the net paid to victims alto-
gether).
Representatives of the insurance industry, in response to a Subcom-
mittee question, stated: "A ... breakdown between plaintiff's attorney
fees and benefits to the claimant is not available from insurance statisti-
cal data. However, if the commonly quoted estimate of one-third of the
settlement as the fee for the plaintiffs attorney is assumed, then $.153
[of the premium dollar] would go to the attorney and $.305 to the
claimant." Newsletter, supra note 16, a; 7.
18. According to other estimates, this figure understates total over-
head (including claimants' administration costs) and, as a corollary,
overstates the net amount paid to claimants. For example, in a preview of
a study by the Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies in Minneapolis, Min-
nesota, under a research grant from the National Institute of Health, it
has been indicated that "only sixteen to twenty-seven cents [of the pres-
ent medical malpractice premium dollar] reaches the patient whereas of
the automobile liability insurance dollar, forty-four cents reaches the vic-
tim and in Workmen's Compensation sixty-four to ninety-three cents
reaches the injured workman." Morris, Medical Report: Malpractice Cri-
sis-A View of Malpractice in the 1970's, 1971 INs. CouNs. J. 521, 523.
Subsequently, Rick Carlson of the Institute opined that only "between
sixteen and seventeen cents of the premium dollar ends up as benefits to
victims of medical injuries." MEDIcAL MALPRAcTIc: A DIscussioN OF AL-
TERNATIVE ComPENsATIoN AND QUALITY CONTROL SYsTEms 5 (D. McDon-
ald ed. 1971) (Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions Occasional
Paper). According to still another study, 16 to 25 per cent of the premium
dollar is eventually paid to patients. CAL. AssEImLY SELECT COMM. ON
MEDIcAL MALPRAcTICE, PREInInNARY B.SPORT 5-6 (1974), cited in Note,
supra note 16, at 1155 n.75. Apparently relying on PHYsIcIANs CRIsis
CoMMITTEE [or DETRoIT], supra note 16, consumer columnist Sylvia Por-
ter has reported that in Michigan 23 cents goes to the patient, with 55
cents being spent on lawyers and litigation expenses and the remaining
22 cents on insurance overhead. Sylvia Porter's column, December 8,
1975. According to Ms. Porter, the situation is "even worse in some other
states." Id. On the other hand, the insurance industry estimate, in reply
to a Subcommittee question, was 31 cents as net payment to victims and
69 cents to total overhead. Newsletter, supra note 16, at 7.
19. The ratio, under tort liability, of pain and suffering payment
(including plaintiffs' attorneys' fees) to out-of-pocket losses (including
those compensated from other sources) is about 1.4:1. See P. KEETON
& R. KEETON, supra note 6, at 515 n.21 (reporting that "the total
amount paid in settlement of a bodily injury claim under the tort liabil-
ity system [for auto accidents] is on the average 2.4 times the amount
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Paid to Compensate for Losses
Also Compensated from Other
Sources (including income
tax saving)20  6.7 cents
Paid to Compensate for Losses
Not Compensated from Other
Sources21  12.5 cents
Net Paid to Victims Altogether 22  28 cents
100 cents
Here, then, for all the agony caused by the medical malprac-
tice tort system, we find that it returns at the most only 28 cents
of the premium dollar to injured patients, and, of that, only 12.5
cents reimburses the patient for dollar losses not otherwise com-
pensated.
In this regard, Phillip Corboy, a prominent personal injury
lawyer, has recently referred to the testimony of a nurse in a case
involving severe burns caused one Jake Crouch when a trans-
former on which he was working exploded and spewed burning
of economic loss," which is another way of saying that the ratio is 1.4:1.)
It might be argued that-given stouter resistance to claims and especially
fewer nuisance claims under medical malpractice insurance, see J.
O'CoNNELL, supra note 17, at 29, 38-41-less is paid for pain and suffering
arising from medical malpractice liability than from auto bodily injury
liability. But for indication that most medical malpractice claims are for
relatively minor injuries and for small amounts ($2000 or less in one-
half of all paid claims), thus justifying an inference that insurance com-
panies prefer a nominal settlement rather than the expense of defending
its insureds, see King, A Commentary on the Report of the Malpractice
Commission, 29 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 294, 295 (1974) (based on, but not
specifically citing, Rudov, Myers, & Mirabella, Medical Malpractice In-
surance Claims Files Closed in 1970, in APPENDIX, REPORT OF SECRETARY'S
COMMISsION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1 (U.S. Dep't of Health, Education,
and Welfare Pub. No. (OS) 73-89, 1973). According to one estimate,
over half of medical malpractice cost is related to awards for "pain and
suffering." Address by Steven Resnick, conference entitled "The Medical
Malpractice Crisis: Managing the Costs," University of Maryland School
of Law, Nov. 21, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Conference]. Also it is the low
limits of automobile liability insurance (often only $20,000) that often
cause little to be paid for pain and suffering in severe cases. Medical
malpractice limits would often be $300,000 higher. Thus I have used
Professor Keeton's ratio to arrive at the figure of 8.8 cents (28 + 18 = 46
+ 2.4 = 19.2 + 18 = 37.2; 46 - 37.2 = 8.8). See note 10 supra.
20. I have calculated this figure on the basis of the Keeton formula
explained in note 11 supra: [(11 percent of 46 cents) = 5 cents] +
[(1/A x 5 cents) = 1.7 cents to account for income tax savings] = 6.7
cents. The result, as in the Keeton calculation, is no doubt a very con-
servative estimate.
21. "After accounting for other purposes to which all the rest of
the premium dollar is committed, we find that only [12.5] cents go to
compensating for losses not otherwise compensated." Note 12 supra.
22, See note 18 supra.
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oil on him. Corboy's purpose apparently is to illustrate the real-
ity of pain and to justify the law's attention to compensating
for it. The nurse describes in detail the extensive (and, one
gathers, hugely expensive) treatment of the patient, including
the careful professional application of Sulfamylon cream plus ex-
tensive and professionally supervised administration of whirlpool
treatments. She then testifies:
[Jake] very soon after he was admitted [to the hospital] became
aware of the fact that the treatment would be a long one....
He would look to the future and getting out of the hospital and
the possibility of getting back to work.... [H]e liked to be out
in his job and he felt this wasn't going to be possible and this
was a factor in his depression, that his life style would have
to change. He often discussed with me what would happen to
his family. He worried about how they- were making out ...
as far as financial arrangements . . .and I would say a great
deal of time he was severely depressed .... 23
The patient in this case was awarded $650,000 after, as Cor-
boy indicates, a lengthy trial (he -does not tell us the length of
time between injury and trial). But Jake Crouch was one of
the lucky ones in being paid at all from the tort liability system.
As the nurse's testimony poignantly indicates, what he needed
was treatment-both physical and psychiatric (for his depres-
sion)-and assurances that his family would be cared for. In
short-as with most of us if seriously injured-he was primarily
concerned with payment for his out-of-pocket losses, not for his
pain and suffering.
Discussion of a products liability case raises the point that
the figures for products liability insurance have not been devel-
oped with even the precision of those available for medical mal-
practice insurance, not to speak of the relatively exhaustive fig-
ures available for automobile liability insurance. But products
liability cases share characteristics with medical malpractice
cases. In both, liability turns on very complicated fact situations
with concomitantly extraordinary expense and delay, and the de-
fendants take offense to attacks on their professional or entrepre-
neurial pride and therefore are inclined to resist settlement more
strongly than, say, the insured motorist-defendant.2 4
23. Couch v. Central Maloney Transformer Corp., No. 75871 (King
County, Washington Superior Court, Apr. 24, 1974) (transcript on file
at the law offices of Philip H. Corby and Associates, 33 N. Dearborn
St., Chicago, 111. 60602), noted in Corboy, The Expanding Universe of
Jeffrey O'Connell: Backing into a "Brave New World" 1976 U. ILL. L.F.
100 n.63.
24. J. O'CoNNELr,, supra note 17, at 17-18, 29.
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Extrapolating (once again, conservatively) from both the
auto liability and medical malpractice figures, we get the follow-
ing figures:
Hypothesis of Where the Bodily Injury Product Liability
Insurance Premium Dollar Goes
General Overheard 25  30 cents
Claims Administration Cost26
Defense Side 18.5 cents
Claimants' Side 14 cents
Total Claims Administration
Cost 32.5 cents
Total Overheard27 62.5 cents
Net Amount Paid to Victims
Above Losses (in theory for
Pain and Suffering) 28  16 cents
Paid to Compensate for Losses
Also Compensated from Other
Sources (including income
tax saving) 29  7.5 cents
Paid to Compensate for Losses
Not Compensated from Other
Sources 30  14 cents
Net Paid to Victims Altogether 3l 37.5 cents
100 cents
25. I have used the medical malpractice figure on the ground that
such coverage, in its complexity and marketing, more closely resembles
that for malpractice liability than for auto liability.
26. I have assumed that the amounts spent for both defendants' and
claimants' legal expenses for products liability lie halfway between the
amounts spent on auto liability and medical malpractice claims. There-
fore, for the defense side 24 cents (medical malpractice) minus 13 cents
(auto liability) = 11; 11 - 2 - 5.5; 24 - 5.5 = 18.5. On the claimants'
side, 18 cents minus 10 cents - 8 cents; 8 - 2 = 4; 18 - 4 = 14.
27. Cf. note 18 supra.
28. As with medical malpractice, see note 19 supra, I have used
the Keeton formula to determine the amount spent to compensate for
pain and suffering: (37.5 + 14 = 51.5 - 2.4 = 21.5 + 14 = 35.5;
51.5 - 35.5 = 16). See note 10 supra.
29. Here also I have used the Keeton formula explained in note 11
supra: [(11 percent of 51.5 cents) = 5.7 cents] + [(3 x 5.67 cents) =
1.89 cents to account for income tax savings] = approximately 7.5 cents.
As with the earlier calculation, this is probably a very conservative esti-
mate. In fact, since so many product liability cases are also covered by
workers' compensation (with its unlimited medical benefits and sub-
stantial wage loss payments), the figure is probably even more con-
servative for products liability than for medical malpractice or auto
liability.
30. "After accounting for other purposes to which all the rest of
the premium dollar is committed, we find that only [14] cents go to
compensating for losses not otherwise compensated." Notes 12 and 21
supra.
31. Cf. note 18 supra.
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Here, too, for all the expense and agony caused by the tort
system we find it returns only 37.5 cents of the premium dollar
to injured victims and, of that, only 14 cents reimburses victims
of malfunctioning products for dollar losses not otherwise com-
pensated.
I. HOW VALUABLE IS COMMON-LAW TORT LIABILITY?
Perhaps the most distressing aspect of the common law's sys-
tem of personal injury insurance is that it compounds the prob-
lem by, in effect, requiring everyone to buy such largely worth-
less but horrendously expensive insurance.
Suppose, instead, that one were given the choice when one
buys a power tool or undergoes an operation:
"Do you wish to buy tort liability insurance?"
"What's that?"
Any decent truth-in-insurance bill would then require the buyer
to be told:
Your chances of being paid any benefits under the insurance
are extremely small. Most people who are injured (by this pro-
cedure/by this product) are not paid from this insurance. In
point of fact about (75/65)32 percent of the premium is used up
by insurance overhead and legal expenses on both sides. And
even if you are one of the rare ones who ever collects under
this insurance, you would only be paid after about two years
or more has elapsed after you had put in your claim. Also there
is a strong chance that before you are paid you would have to
appear in court (at least in a lawyer's office for pretrial proceed-
ings under oath) not only to tell your story but to be sharply
cross-examined by the insurance company's lawyer who, frank-
ly, will often be out to cast doubt on your credibility and relia-
bility. That can be a very humiliating experience. In addition
even if you go to trial and win, it is very likely that there will
be an appeal-or several appeals-which can take from an ad-
ditional year or two before you would be paid, assuming you
win the appeal.
Of course, we lawyers have seen to it that no one is forced
to explain the dubious value of insurance covering tort liability.
And, in a measure, there is no point in telling the consumer/pa-
tient of the relatively worthless nature of such insurance inas-
much as he is not allowed to reject it even if he discovers its
worthlessness. On the contrary, because tort liability is imposed
by common law, tort liability insurance must be bought by every-
one who buys a product or undergoes medical treatment since
any reputable manufacturer, retailer, or health care provider will
32. See text accompanying notes 16-18, 25-27 supra.
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buy such insurance and add the cost of it to the overall cost
of the product or service. The cases are replete with pronounce-
ments from judges that any manufacturer, retailer, or health care
provider who tries to dispense with tort liability in the sale of
a product or service will not be allowed to do so. 33
A. PATCHWORK REFORM
What to do about all of this? One could in essence maintain
the present system for lack of any other alternative. Such main-
tenance could, it is true, probably be accompanied by some
window dressing changes. But none of those so far suggested
would likely change things except in the slightest way-and pos-
sibly for the worse.
One reform often advanced as a solution is arbitration of
medical malpractice claims. As a practical matter, however, the
problem of the present system is not who is hearing these claims
but what is being heard. Replacing a judge or juries with law-
yers and other panelists dressed in business suits will help only
marginally at best. As two insurance executives have put it:
"Arbitration cases appear to require the same preparation and
negotiating processes of other claims and may thereby increase
the actual preparation cost of claims by the addition of arbitra-
tion fees to the other legal fees."34
A second proposal frequently offered is the so-called "claims
made" system. In the words of Dean Richard Rosett of the Grad-
uate School of Business of the University of Chicago, however:
A change from policies that insure the physician forever
against claims arising from treatment given this year to a
[claims made] policy that insures him against claims that arise
this year from treatments ever given is not fundamental. It
eliminates-or at least reduces-the forecasting problems unpre-
dictable inflation poses, but in a reasonably predictable econ-
omy, steady-state cost of insurance will be the same either way.
Under the present system, for example, the insurance company
charges the physician now for claims that will arise 15 years
from now and that premium is part of the physician's expense
and is reflected in what he charges for treatment. Under the
suggested change he would know that insurance would be
needed 15 years hence to protect him against claims arising from
treatment given now. A proper counting of his expense now
will include provision for that future premium. It does not mat-
ter whether the insurance company must set something aside
33. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, 60 Cal
2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963); Hunter v. American Rentals,
Inc., 189 Kan. 615, 371 P.2d 131 (1962).
34. Greenfield & Hoffman, No-Fault or Arbitration Proposed as
Solutions to Malpractice Woes, Bus. INs., Feb. 4, 1974, at 33.
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now to meet future claims or whether he must set something
aside to buy insurance in the future. The cost should be the
same.3 5
Thus, in addition to generating no cost savings, by requiring a
doctor to forecast his future cost to cover his costs after he retires
(or the costs to his estate after he dies), a claims made policy
shifts the most unpredictable risks to those far less able to pre-
dict and prepare for those risks than insurance companies. What
this probably would mean as a practical matter is that the typical
doctor, far from setting aside reserves this year to pay for future
claims arising from this year's services, would be paying in future
years (and then forcing his patients to pay) for the liability aris-
ing from his services rendered this year-a sort of deficit financ-
ing, if you will, with the greater problems this would present
to doctors and their families on retirement or death.
A third suggestion is that limits be placed on contingent fees
that can be charged by plaintiff's lawyers. Curiously enough,
nothing is concomitantly said about curbing defense lawyers'
fees. Since the problem of medical malpractice stems from litiga-
tion between two sides, why is an equitable solution to limit what
one side can spend on litigation while ignoring the other? As
long as we keep a system-like the fault system-that depends
on litigation, how much sense does it make to limit by statute
either side's (or both sides') access to litigation?
B. ABANDONMENT OF TORT LiABILITY
An alternative to maintaining, with minor adjustments, the
present tort liability system for meical malpractice and products
liability litigation would simply be to abolish the tort liability
system as it applies to such areas and let anyone who so desires
buy his own coverage for his own loss. At first blush, the solu-
tion seems too extreme to be seriously proffered or considered.
But weigh the following exchange between Congressman Bob
Eckhardt, Democrat from Texas, and former Dean Erwin N. Gris-
wold of the Harvard Law School, certainly a conservative, care-
ful legal scholar, concerning a no-fault law that would similarly
simply abolish tort liability and leave anyone who so desires free
to buy his own coverage for his own loss:
Ma. ECKHAm.... In H.R. 10 I[a federal no-fault automo-
bile insurance bill], there is a provision [eliminating] tort lia-
bility with respect to property losses altogether. Then H.R. 10
provides for optional coverage under no-fault [for] property
35. Remarks of Richard Rosett, Conference, supra note 19.
[Vol. 60:501
ELECTIVE NO-FAULT
damage. So the result would be that an individual would
either have to elect to accept ... no-fault liability by buying
no-fault insurance, which must be offered to him but which is
not mandatory, [or not] . . . be covered at all [since] H.R. 10
broadly limits tort liability in any event.
[I]t seems to me that when the statute merely gives a person
the opportunity to elect coverage by insurance, thus not estab-
lishing a complete system of reparation, and at the same time
broadly wipes out tort liability, there may be a serious constitu-
tional question.
MR. GRISWOLD .... I don't, myself, find that question very
difficult. I would think that Congress, under the commerce
power, if it chooses to do so, for whatever reasons that appear
to warrant it, could entirely eliminate property damage liability.
That is, in effect, what H.R. 10 does.
If that were done, then persons who own automobiles or
other property may well want to consider the question of
whether they should obtain insurance for that. As I understand
it, that is the effect of H.R. 10.
MR. EcKHAmnr. Well, Dean, suppose we did not pass any no-
fault statute, but the United States Congress decided that all tort
liability was too burdensome and too costly and simply provided
that tort liability for ... property damages. . . shall hencefor-
ward be wiped out in the Union[;] could you do that constitu-
tionally[? ]
MR. GRISWOLD. Congressman Eckhardt, in my opinion, Con-
gress could do that if it chooses to do so.6
Of course, Dean Griswold was discussing the abolition of tort
liability for property damage. One can make the case, however,
that if a legislature could abolish tort liability for property dam-
age, a fortiori, it could do the same for tort liability for personal
injury arising out of the use of manufactured products or medical
treatment. It is not without significance that a lower Michigan
court has found the Michigan no-fault auto law abolishing tort
liability for property damage invalid on the ground that the old
common-law tort system, coupled with the availability of colli-
sion insurance, had been working sufficiently well that such
abolition of tort liability was unconstitutional37 Perhaps, then,
36. Hearings on H. Con. Res. 116 Before the Subcomm. on Com-
merce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 115, pt. 2, at 1207-08 (1975).
37. Shavers v. Kelley, No. 73-248-068-C2 (Mich. Cir. Ct., May 30,
1974), CCH Auto. Ins. Cas. f 8308 (1974), in J. O'CosNELL & R. HENDER-
SON, TORT LAw, No-FAULT Am BEYOND: TEACHING MATERIALS ON COM-
PENSATION FOR ACCIDENTS AND AILMENTS IN MODERN SOCIETY 462 (1975).
The court viewed the issue as one of due process, concluding that the
abolition unreasonably deprived property owners of their common-law
right to sue for damages. The intermediate appellate court opinion, af-
firming the trial court on these points, has not yet been published. The
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a tort system working as poorly as does that for product liability
and medical malpractice should be viewed as more subject to
such legislative abolition.
Thus it is that several states have recently put "caps" or lim-
its on what can be obtained in medical malpractice actions. For
example, in California, the limit is $250,000 (for pain and suffer-
ing); in Idaho, $150,000; in Indiana, $500,000; in Illinois $500,000;
in Ohio, $200,000 (for pain and suffering).18 Two trial courts-
one in Idaho3 9 and the other in Il[inois4 -- have recently ruled
these statutes unconstitutional. Admittedly, therefore, there is
grave doubt about how courts will view a simple abolition of
the tort remedy for medical malpractice or products liability,
given doubts about the lesser step of limiting the amount of tort
liability. In a measure, however, the courts' willingness to strike
down such limitations as unconstitutional, while never question-
ing the constitutionality of limits of, say, $5000, $10,000, or $20,000
uniformly prevailing in the United States for tort liability insur-
ance for auto accidents, demonstrates how totally unrealistic are
the courts in their attitudes toward insurance and torts. Limita-
tions on the amount of insurance that motorists must carry have
a pervasively devastating effect on how much is in fact available
for accidents involving negligence in that jurisdiction (especially
since a claimant may be unable to discover the limits of insurance
carried by any motorist).41 A limit of $500,000 on medical mal-
practice verdicts, on the other hand, in a jurisdiction like Indiana
will probably affect no claimant for years, if ever, and indeed,
will rarely affect any claimant in any jurisdiction. Yet the latter
is quickly struck down and the former goes unquestioned for gen-
erations!42  Constitutions may no longer be color-blind, but
their eyesight still seems woefully weak.
matter is yet to be decided by the Michigan supreme court. See also
Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
38. For a chart (with current supplements) of such laws, along with
other laws (such as those altering statutes of limitations or eliminating
ad damnum clauses), see AjMERcAN INSIURANCE Ass'N, COMPARATIVE AN-
ALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE CHANGES RELATED TO MTEDICAL MALPRACTICE chart
TT (1975) (available from American Insurance Association, 85 John
Street, New York, N.Y. 10038).
39. Jones v. State Bd. of Med., Civ. No. 55527 (Idaho Dist. Ct., Sept.
23, 1975), in 18 Ass'N TRIAL L. Am. NEWS LETTER 365 (1975).
40. For a newspaper report on the Illinois case, see Associated Press
Release, Nov. 28, 1975.
41. See Mecke v. Bahr, 177 Neb. 584, 129 N.W.2d 573 (1964); Hard-
ware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hopkins, 105 N.H. 231, 196 A.2d 66 (1963); Annot.,
13 A.L.R.3d 817 (1967).
42. I am indebted to Professor Robert E. Keeton for suggesting this
difference in attitudes toward insurance limits.
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Thus, given the relatively worthless nature of tort liability
insurance as an insurance mechanism, one forced to choose be-
tween retaining the present system and simply abolishing it, (at
least as applied to personal injury for products liability and medi-
cal malpractice), would probably more sensibly abolish it than re-
tain it. In addition to all the money spent on overhead costs
and legal fees,43 one must take account of the substantial
amounts of money and energy spent by the medical profession
trying to avoid tort liability in a manner that, far from helping
the patient, hurts him. Dr. James Potchen, head of the Michi-
gan State University Radiology Department and chairman of the
Committee on Radiology of the American Medical Association,
tells us that around one billion dollars a year is being spent na-
tionally for largely unnecessary X-rays that physicians now
order to protect themselves from potential malpractice claims:
Potchen ... said that in many cases doctors ordering the X-
rays know that they will be of little medical value in making
a diagnosis.
However, Dr. Potchen ... said doctors are "beginning to
feel that if they don't perform these tests they'll get sued for
malpractice."
He cited as an example a skull X-ray which is almost al-
ways ordered for youngsters when they are brought to emer-
gency rooms for head injuries even though studies have shown
the X-rays are all but useless.
Even though this is widely known, Dr. Potchen said, the
skull X-ray has become standardized in the law as a medical
practice and therefore doctors are afraid to do away with it
Overall, about 11 per cent of all X-rays given patients are
a result of so-called defensive medicine-medicine that may in
itself have no value other than to forestall the possible lawsuit,
he said.
He estimated that the cost to consumers could be between
$200 million and $1 billion yearly, with the higher figure more
likely.44
Not only are the services superfluous, but-given the dangers
of exposure to radiation-they lead to needlessly added injuries!
Admittedly, however, many will be concerned about the oc-
casional claimant who, after tort liability for medical malpractice
and products liability has been abolished, has no major medical
or other catastrophic insurance coverage but who nonetheless
would have had a valid tort claim against a health care provider
or product manufacturer. Perhaps the only answer to this di-
43. See notes 16-18 supra and accompanying text.
44. Baltimore Sun, Nov. 22, 1975, § B, at 1-2, cols. 4-5. See also
Remarks of James Potchen, Conference, supra note 19.
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lemma is to keep in mind how few and fortuitous are such claims;
and if, as is likely, it is the poor who are most likely to be with-
out their own coverage against catastrophe, keep in mind, too,
that it is the poor who seem least likely to pursue a tort remedy
and who certainly derive the least benefit from the tort system.
In the words of H. Laurence Ross, a sociologist who has studied
the tort liability system:
[T] ort law in action may... be termed inequitable. It is
responsive to a wide variety of influences that are not defined
as legitimate by common standards of equity. The interviews
and observations I conducted convinced me that the negotiated
settlement rewards the sophisticated claimant and penalizes the
inexperienced, the naive, the simple, and the indifferent. Trans-
lating these terms into social statuses, I believe that the settle-
ment produces relatively more for the affluent, the educated, the
white, and the city-dweller. It penalizes the poor, the unedu-
cated, the Negro and the countryman. 45
Others will be concerned about the effect on deterrence if
tort liability is simply abolished for products liability and medi-
cal malpractice. This worry, too, probably fails to stand up. De-
spite exhaustive attempts to identify them, little, if any, deter-
rent effects of the present product liability system could be dis-
covered by the National Commission on Product Safety.46 And
while medical malpractice liability may lead to defensive and
even unsafe medicine, no one seems able to point to any evidence
of the present system acting as a deterrent and thereby leading
45. H. Ross, SLttLED OUT OF CouRT: THE SoCIAL PRocEss OF INSUR-
ANCE CLAi s ADJUSTmENTS 241-42 (1970). Consider the following table:
Table 3.25. Relationship of Family Income to Serious Injury
and Fatality [Automobile] Cases, to Retention of
Counsel, and to Reparations Received.
Percent Ratio of net reparations
Family income retaining counel to economic loss(1) (2) (3)
Under $5,000 30.0 0.38
$5,000-9,999 36.7 0.52$10,000 and over 41.9 0.61
Total 35.0 0.49
1 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, ECONOMIC CoNsEQ-ENCEs OF AUTOMOBILE
AccnDENT INJURIEs 54 (1970) (Automobile Insurance and Compensation
Study). The reparations received figures include both tort and nontort
sources, with "'[a]bout one-third' of recovery [for bodily injury and
property damage] from tort." Id. at 2.
46. See 9A NATONAL Comm'I ON PRODUCT SAFETr, HEARINGS 311-
18 (1970) (testimony of Herbert Denenberg); Whitford, Products Liabil-
ity, in 3 SUPPLEimNTAL STUDIEs, PRODUCT SAFETY LAw AND ADwMasTRA-
rioN: FEDErAL, STATE, LOcAL AND COMMON LAw 221, 228-29 (National
Commission on Product Safety 1970). For a summary of the preceding
commentary, see J. O'Connell, supra note 17, at 22-24.
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to safer medicine. Even Guido Calabresi, perhaps the leading
advocate of imaginative use of the tort and insurance systems
to achieve deterrence, recently concluded that there is no basis
for believing that the present tort liability system promotes qual-
ity medical care.47 In short, when a system is as highly wasteful
and arbitrary as is the present tort system, the burden rests heav-
ily on those who would maintain it to demonstrate its effective-
ness as a deterrent, not on those who would abolish it to prove
that such abolition would have no unsalutary effect on deter-
rence. That is a burden that defenders of the status quo mani-
festly have been unable to meet, except by intuition and anec-
dote.48
Even granted the failings of tort liability, however, one must
admit that for political, practical, and constitutional reasons the
revolutionary solution of simply abolishing it without any sub-
stitute should be avoided, if possible. Bear in mind it has been
assumed by many courts-state and federal (arguably errone-
ously in light of Dean Griswold's testimony, for example) 49-that
a substituted remedy, such as mandated no-fault benefits, must
be provided if common-law tort rights are to be abolished. 50
There are similar political, practical, and constitutional obstacles
to a proposal advanced by Professor Richard Epstein of the Uni-
versity of Chicago, urging much greater tolerance by the courts
for contractual arrangements to abandon or limit tort liability.
Under Professor Epstein's proposal, health care providers would
be allowed to impose all or most of the risks of medical proce-
dures on patients under the doctrine of assumption of risk; they
would be allowed, for example, to limit their liability to, say,
gross negligence, or to put tight limits on the dollar amount of
their tort liability. "Private agreements of free individuals," he
47. Remarks of Guido Calabresi, Conference, supra note 19.
48. See, e.g., Cartwright, Therapeutic Effect of Tort Law, 18 Ass'x
TRIAL L. AM. NEws Lrrun 2 (1975).
49. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
50. See, e.g., Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 21-23, 271 N.E.2d 592,
605-06 (1971). Although the requirement that an adequate and reason-
able substitute for the abrogated tort recovery must be provided was
enunciated by the Supreme Court in New York Cent. R.R. v. White,
243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917), "it is doubtful that the Court would find the
test necessary today. Nonetheless, the dictum has given the reasonable
substitute test considerable impetus in state courts. All cases examining
the constitutionality of no-fault legislation on due process grounds have
applied this test." Note, Due Process Problems of Property Damage No-
Fault Insurance, 8 U. MicH. J.L. RFromv 646, 649 & n.25 (1975). But




argues, "promise the best solution to the problems of medical
malpractice in a world in which no perfect solution is possible."5' 1
If then, there is little sense in retaining with minor adjust-
ments the tort system of compensation for personal injuries aris-
ing from malfunctioning products or medical services, and if it
is not practical to abolish that system, what can be done?
II. ELECTIVE NO-FAULT RJEEFORM FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. APPLICABILITY OF WoRKERs' COMPENSATION AND AUTOMOBILE
LmABnaTY REFORImS
The basic difficulty with present medical malpractice and
products liability insurance is fundamentally a replication of the
difficulties that plagued industrial accident insurance before
workers' compensation and automobile liability insurance before
no-fault auto insurance. In each case, traditional tort liability
demanded (as it still does) answers to the intractable questions
of (1) who is at fault (or whose product is defective) in causing
the accident, and (2) what is the monetary value of something
essentially untranslatable into dollars and cents-pain and suf-
fering.
The solution for industrial and auto accidents has long been
seen as relatively simple: Structure the insurance system so that
it pays (1) for losses regardless of fault and (2) only for out-
of-pocket losses (essentially, medical expenses and wage loss,
which are readily reducible to dollars and cents, and not pain
and suffering, which are not).52 Thereby, in one simple stroke
these two questions that plague the system are eliminated, with
payment for more claims financed by the savings from simplify-
ing the insured event (by not having to pay either (1) for deter-
mination of fault and the monetary value of pain and suffering
51. In a way, the proposals examined in this Article can be ar-
ranged in the following spectrum:
(1) Legislative abolition or limitation of tort liability.
(2) Epstein's proposal for contractual abolition or limitation of tort
liability.(3) My proposal for elective no-fault insurance as a substitute for
tort liability, relatively loosely supervised by the courts and insurance
commissioners. See notes 55-56 infra and. accompanying text.
(4) Professor Clark Havighurst's proposal for no-fault insurance as
a substitute for tort liability, pursuant to tightly structured governmen-
tally mandated standards to protect patients. See notes 57-58, 126 infra
and accompanying text.
52. See J. O'CoNwELL, supra note 17, chs. 2, 4, 10.
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or (2) for pain and suffering itself). Applying this solution to
medical malpractice insurance is somewhat more complex be-
cause it is more difficult to define the no-fault insured event for
medical maloccurrences than for industrial or auto accidents.
Under a no-fault system the employer pays an employee-victim
injured in an accident "arising out of or in the course of employ-
ment,"53 regardless of anyone's fault; the motorist pays any mo-
toring victim injured in an accident "arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle,154 regardless of anyone's
fault. But it is not feasible simply to force the health care pro-
vider similarly to pay any patient "injured in the course of medi-
cal treatment," regardless of anyone's fault. The problem is how
to define whether the patient was injured in the course of medi-
cal treatment, as opposed to suffering injury due to his own prior
condition that sent him to a health care provider in the first place
(his so-called presenting complaint). Assume that a patient goes
to a doctor with a thyroid condition: the doctor treats him (per-
haps by an operation)-the patient gets worse. A health care
provider could not realistically be asked to pay for any worsened
condition after treatment; but determining which worsened con-
ditions are due to the doctor's intervention and which to the pa-
tient's presenting complaint would be as intractable as determin-
ing the criteria for payment under the present negligence crite-
rion. As indicated in the report of the [HEW] Secretary's Com-
mission on Medical Malpractice:
At the outset, the Commission members wrestled with the
virtually impossible task of defining the "compensable event"
which results from a " medical injury". Every effort to date on
this subject has met with the same lack of success. Although
we have a reasonable understanding of the terms "work injury"
and "automobile accident injury", we have no real mental pic-
ture that covers the field of medical injuries. Does a 'medical
injury" occur when a physician fails to heal his patient or fails
to heal him quickly, in the face of the joint hopes by the physi-
cian and the patient that an early recovery can be obtained?
Illness and accidental injury become inextricably intertwined
when fault issues are ignored. 55
To be sure, other similar problems attend defining the com-
pensable event for products liability. Ladder manufacturers
53. This language appears in a typical workers' compensation stat-
ute. 1 A. LARSON, Wosxmmes ComVENsATIoN LAw § 6.00 et seq. (1972).
54. I. KEETON & J. O'CoNNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
VicTim 303 (1965).
55. SECRETARY'S COI'N oN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE: REPORT 131, 132-33 (U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare Pub. No. (OS) 73-88, 1973) (statement of Richard M. Markus).
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would undoubtedly find it overwhelming to be asked to pay for
all injuries resulting from falls from ladders regardless of the
users' negligence or a lack of any defect in the ladder; similarly,
stove manufacturers would find absurd a demand for compensa-
tion for all injuries resulting from burns from stoves.
While for this reason no-fault insurance cannot be applied
across the board to all adverse results of medical treatment and
manufacturing (the way in which it can be applied across the
board to all industrial or auto accidents), this is not to say that
it could not be applied to many such adverse effects of both.
Health care providers and manufacturers can probably identify
hundreds of maloccurrences that can be readily isolated and for
which it would be feasible to apply the no-fault bargain: prompt
payment for out-of-pocket losses in return for waiver of the right
to sue based on alleged fault for possible, but by no means cer-
tain, payment for out-of-pocket loss plus pain and suffering. For
such identifiable injuries, the savings realized from eliminating
payment for (1) insurance overhead and legal fees and (2) pain
and suffering could be used to finance prompt and expeditious
payment regardless of fault. Moreover, the bargain should in-
clude no payment under no-fault insurance that would duplicate
payment already made from other sources, such as Blue Cross
and employer-paid sick leave. The advantages to insureds and
their insurers thus would be (1) potentially lower premiums; (2)
greater certainty of the extent of potential liability, in that liabil-
ity would no longer turn on the vicissitudes of unpredictable
common-law liability but rather on defined, predictable com-
pensable events; (3) avoidance of stigmatization or paying a
windfall gain solely because of fortuitous injury; (4) use of insur-
ance dollars to pay genuine losses, as opposed to devoting large
amounts to payment of legal fees amd company overhead; and
(5) good will arising from prompt payment to customers/patients
versus ill will stemming from resistance to claims for injuries
attributable to the use of products or services.
As examples of the way elective no-fault liability would
work, a manufacturer of a power ;ool could elect to take out
a no-fault policy to pay for out-of-pocket losses-medical expense
and wage loss-whenever an amputation results from use of
the power tool. Just as no-fault auto insurance pays without
regard to anyone's negligence, so payment would be made in this
instance without regard to the victim's possible carelessness or
the lack of any defect in the tool. Similarly, a doctor who knows
the inevitable risks of, say, cardiac axrest occurring in even nor-
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mal patients in the course of a given surgical procedure could
agree to pay for out-of-pocket losses stemming from such an ad-
verse result of an operation regardless of anyone's fault. In both
cases, the prior agreement to make such no-fault payments would
wipe out any claim based on fault, just as happens under no-
fault auto insurance.56
B. DEFINING COmPENSABLE EVENTs
In a 1974 article, Clark Havighurst and Lawrence Tancredi
listed some examples of likely adverse results arising from surgi-
cal treatment that might be selected as compensable events under
a. no-fault -plan: They included, for example, postoperative infec-
tions, thrombophlebitis and embolism, catheter infections, aller-
gic and toxic reactions to antibiotic and other drugs, blood trans-
fusion reactions, foreign bodies, growth deformity secondary to
bone injury, Volkmann's contracture and other consequences
from casts, and failure of healing of fractures (including mal-
union, nonunion, and delayed union). 57 This list was compiled
56. Note, too, the flexibility possible under elective no-fault liabil-
ity. For example, electors might be allowed to experiment with no-fault
liability for products produced during a given period. In addition, the
elector might be allowed to limit the amount of no-fault benefits for
which he is liable to multiples of $10,000, assuming the enabling legisla-
tion authorized a corresponding tort exemption measured against both
out-of-pocket loss and pain and suffering. For example, if no-fault bene-
fits of $20,000 are provided, no tort suit could be maintained for out-of-
pocket loss less than $20,000, nor for pain and suffering less than $20,000.
See J. O'CONNELL, supra note 17, at 104-06. For more extensive discus-
sions of elective no-fault insurance generally, see J. O'CONNELL, supra
note 17. For a precis of the book, see O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Liabil-
ity Insurance for All Kinds of Accidents: A Proposal, 1973 INs. L.J. 495;
for a draft statute, with commentary, implementing the proposal, see
O'Connell, An Elective No-Fault Liability Statute, 1975 INs. L.J. 261; for
a discussion of implementing the proposal by contract, with or without
an enabling statute, see O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Liability by Con-
tract-With or Without an Enabling Statute, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 59, printed
in slightly different form in O'Connell, No-Fault Liability by Contract
for Doctors, Manufacturers, Retailers and Others, 1975 INs. L.J. 531.
For other articles on the subject by the author (set out in approxi-
mate chronological order of appearance), see O'Connell, Elective No-
Fault Insurance for Many Kinds of Accidents: A Proposal and an
"Economic" Analysis, 42 TENN. L. REv. 145 (1974); O'Connell, It's Time
for No-Fault for All Kinds of Injuries, 60 A.B.A.J. 1070 (1974); O'Con-
nell, The Frustrations of Insurance, 43 U. Cnr. L. REv. 847 (1974);
O'Connell, No-Fault Insurance for Injuries Arising from Medical Treat-
ment: A Proposal for Elective Coverage, 24 EmoRY L.J. 21 (1975).
57. Havighurst & Tancredi, "Medical Adversity Insurance"--A No-
Fault Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 1974 INs.
L.J. 69, 76.
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after informal consultation with a group of orthopedists. Other
specialities could compile similar lists-and all would be much
more extensive than the exemplars listed above.
Indeed, Professor Havighurst has himself more recently com-
piled a more technically ambitious list of adverse results of gen-
eral surgery and anesthesiology that might be candidates for
compensable events under no-fault insurance. He indicated that
the list for general surgery "was compiled by reviewing the most
common surgical complications and considering them in light of
the following questions:"
1. To what extent is the incidence of this complication re-
lated to the technical skill, judgment, or attentiveness of the sur-
geon?
2. Is this complication a clinically distinct entity? Can its
existence be readily substantiated?
3. How early in the postoperative period is this complica-
tion detectable?
4. How costly are the sequelae of this complication?
5. Would an incentive to minimize the occurrence of this
complication bias the choice of treatment in unfortunate ways?5 8
It is clear that Professor Havighurst focuses in item 1 on com-
pensating for adverse results most likely to have been caused
by physician error-to adverse results relatively avoidable, in the
aggregate, by a health care provider. But items 2 through 5
do not necessarily thus limit compensable events. Even unavoid-
able events may meet the criteria of items 2 through 5 and might
thus be included as compensable events under elective no-fault
insurance. In other words, both avoidable and unavoidable re-
58. Remarks of Clark Havighurst, Conference, supra note 19, in
Havighurst, "Medical Adversity Insurance"-Has Its Time Come?, 1975
DUKE L.J. 1233, 1256 n. 71 [hereinafter cited as Havighurst].
The suggested compensable events in the original [Havig-
hurst-Tancredi no-fault] ... proposal [see notes 57-58 supra and
accompanying text] were merely illustrative of possibilities.
The only set of events carefully considered at that time was
blood transfusion reactions [... which were deemed appro-
priate for compensation under a hospital-purchased [no-fault]
... policy even in the case of certain hepatitis reactions which
were neither clearly avoidable nor clearly caused by the trans-
fusion]. Although the [Havighuxst-Tancredi] ... proposal
contemplated extensive professional investigation of numerous
events which were candidates for the list, no professional
groups have taken up the project, and it has not been possible
to involve physicians extensively in subsequent investigations.
The results of further specification efforts are therefore still
highly tentative.
Our recent efforts toward compiling a definitive list of
compensable events have concentrated on anesthesiology and
general surgery.
Id., 1975 DuKE L.J. at 1256.
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sults might be subject to no-fault compensation. 59 Indeed, to
otherwise limit no-fault compensation (with its lower pay-out)
would be to undercut the bargain of no-fault insurance: less pay-
ment to more people in return for abandoning the fault criterion.
After all, we did not institute no-fault insurance for industrial
or auto accidents only for those injuries most likely avoidable
through the exercise of due care by the employer or motorist.
Nor need we do so for medical maloccurrences. The bargain,
then, of no-fault insurance is that the insurer agrees to pay for
both avoidable and unavoidable injuries instead of only for avoid-
able injuries; the savings from (1) not having to distinguish be-
tween the two and (2) not paying as much per case (by, for ex-
ample, eliminating payment for pain and suffering) serve to
finance payment for unavoidable as well as avoidable injuries.
What follows, then, is Professor Havighurst's more extensive
list of compensable events. The only caveat one must keep in
mind in perusing it is that although it is limited to events that,
in the aggregate, are relatively avoidable, an ultimate list would
not have to be thus limited. That aside, the list illustrates the
flavor of what at least some items on such a list would be.
1. General Surgery6o
General
1. Foreign bodies acquired intraoperatively
2. Bums acquired intraoperatively
3. Injury resulting from severance of an indwelling
plastic catheter 6'
4. Neurological deficit resulting from intramuscular
injection
5. Injury resulting from mistaken identity
6. Injury resulting from inadvertent intravascular in-
jection of local anesthetic
59. See id., 1975 DUKE L.J. at 1273-77.
60. List from Id. n. 71, 1975 DuE L.J. at 1257-60.
The primary source consulted [for the general surgery list]
was C. P. Artz & J. B. Hardy, eds., MANAGEmmT OF SURGICAL
COMP.ICATIONS (3d ed., 1975).Id.
61. The relative avoidability of this complication is illustrated
by the striking diminution of its incidence as practitioners have
become more aware of the technical mistake which creates the
difficulty. "Such occurrences can be minimized by careful at-
tention to the management of the catheter and the catheter site
as well as the utilization of radiopaque catheters and the careful
measurement of the length of the catheter before insertion and
after removal." Moncrief, Complications of Parenteral Fluid
Therapy, in MANAGEMENT Or SURGICAL COMPLICATIONS, supra
note [60], at 68, 75.
Id. n.72, 1975 DuxE L.J. at 1257 n.72.
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7. Postoperative wound dehiscence in noncarcinoma-
tous patient under age forty-five6 2
8. Tetanus infection subseaquent to treatment of wound
9. Severe reaction to administration of tetanus anti-
toxin [On irreversible neurological damage or death fol-
lowing intraoperative cardiac arrest or spinal anesthesia,
see Anesthesiology below.]
Procedure-specific
Parathyroid surgery or thyroidectomy
10. Permanent recurrent laryngeal nerve damage6 3
11. Postoperative hypoparathyroidism exceeding two
weeks' duration6 4
Thyroidectomy or tonsillectomy
12. Death in the immediate postoperative period65
Cholecystectomy
62. "Studies have shown that a few surgeons will have many
wounds with dehiscence and others will have extremely few.
Surgical technique is important." Hunt, Wound Complication,
in MAXAGEMENT OF SURGICAL COMPLICATIONS, supra note [60], at
21, 25. A number of technical errors are known to increase the
likelihood of dehiscence. Other variables, such as age and con-
dition of the patient and the type of operation performed, also
affect the incidence of this complication. Restricting compensa-
bility to patients under forty-five would help to screen out the
effects of the principal variables that lie beyond the surgeon's
control.
Id. n.73, 1975 DUKE L.J. at 1257 n.73.
63. "In the hands of competent surgeons experienced in expos-
ing the recurrent laryngeal nerves, permanent nerve injury oc-
curs in less than 1 per cent of cases." Hardy, Complications
of Thyroid and Parathyroid Surgery, in MANAGEMENT OF SURGICAL
COMPLICATIONS, supra note [60], at 291, 300. Technical skill and
attentiveness are probably the key variables determining the in-
cidence of the Complication. Permanent abnormal phonation
and serious respiratory obstruction are the sequelae involved.
Id. n.74, 1975 DUKE L.J. at 1257-58 n.74.
64. If all four parathyroid glands are inadvertently removed
during surgery, hypocalcemic tetany will result, and lifelong
drug therapy will be necessary to compensate for the activity
of the removed glands. "In a review of 600 cases of thyroid
surgery . . . 17 (2.8 per cent) cases of transient postoperative
hypocalcemic tetany and nine (1.5 per cent) cases of permanent
hypoparathyroidism [were found]." [Hardy, supra note 63, at
300.] Preserving the parathyroids during total thyroidectomies
for thyroid malignancy is a difficult technical feat; for this rea-
son some may suggest that compensability be restricted to pa-
tients without thyroid malignancy. Others may argue that pre-
cisely because of the difficulty of the procedure, the adverse out-
come should be made compensable to deter less technically com-
petent surgeons from attempting the operation.
Id. n.75, 1975 DUKE L.J. at 1258 n.75.
65. Careful observations in the postoperative period will pre-
vent the fatal consequence of uncontrolled hemorrhage. "The
most distressing fact is that, though this hazard and possible se-
quelae are well known on all active surgical services, every 3
or 4 years in most general hospitals some patient loses his life
from this cause." [Hardy, note 63, at 296.] Designating "death"
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13. Injury to common bile duct 6o
Venous stripping
14. Injury from inadvertent stripping of femoral artery
Gastrointestinal procedures
15. Inadvertent gastroileostomy67
16. Duodenal stump leakage following gastric resec-
tions
17. Instrumental perforation of esophagus 9
Gynecology70
18. Perforation of uterus during dilatation and curet-
tage
19. Vesicovaginal, ureterovaginal, rectovaginal, or en-
terovaginal fistula following gynecological procedure on
noncarcinomatous patient
20. Permanent damage to ureter
Prostatectomy
21. Rectal injury
22. Permanent urinary incontinence
Treatment of fracture
23. Nerve paralysis following treatment with straps,
splints, or casts7 '
as the compensable event rather than "postoperative hemor-
rhage" serves three goals: (1) Death is obviously not subject
to the definitional problems inherent in a term like "hemor-
rhage." (2) Hemorrhage promptly noticed and controlled will
not result in injury significant enough to compensate. (3) While
the hemorrhage itself is of questionable avoidability, the surgeon
can affect the consequences of hemorrhage by careful postopera-
tive monitoring.
Id. n.76, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1258 n.76.
66. Careless dissection and blind clamping of bleeding vessels
can produce an injury to the common bile duct. "Perhaps less
than half of those who sustain a stricture due to operative injury
survive for 10 years." Glenn, Complications Following Opera-
tions Upon the Biliary Tract, in MANAGMENT OF SURGIcAL COM-
PL cATIONs, supra note [60], at 501, 521.
Id. n.77, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1258 n.77.
67. This technical error can be avoided by careful identification
of anatomical structures. Its occurrence necessitates reopera-
tion.
Id. n.78, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1258 n.78.
68. Duodenal stump leakage is the most serious common com-
plication and the main source of mortality in gastric resections.
Surgical judgment, technical skill, and postoperative manage-
ment are among the variables affecting its incidence.
Id. n.79, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1258 n.79.
69. As the use of instrumentation in the treatment of GI condi-
tions has increased, instrumental perforation of the esophagus
has emerged as a serious complication. This outcome is rela-
tively avoidable.
Id. n.80, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1258 n. 80.
70. These complications are highly avoidable.
Id. n.81, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1259 n,81.
71. "Delayed nerve paralysis is practically always secondary to
faulty treatment." Hampton, Complications of Common Frac-
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28. Nephrectomy in the absence of a normally function-
ing contralateral kidney
2. Anesthesiology
In anesthesiology, highly detailed specification of events
compensable under [no-fault insurance] . .. such as has
been attempted for general surgery, is appropriate for dental
and peripheral nerve injuries occurring under anesthesia,
and such injuries should be included on the list covered by
the anesthesiologist's [no-fault] . . . policy. This piecemeal
approach seems inadequate, however, to manage the most
serious adverse consequences of anesthesia, namely death or
irreversible central nervous system damage occurring in a
wide variety of surgical circumstances....
... Thus, it is tentatively proposed to make compensa-
ble any death or irreversible central nervous system injury
under anesthesia occurring in a patient between six months
and sixty years of age undergoing any of the following pro-
cedures: tonsillectomy, cholecystectomy, hysterectomy, di-
latation and curettage, repair of inguinal or hiatal hernia,
abortion, sterilization, uterine suspension, venous stripping,
thyroidectomy, mastectomy, and gastrectomy.
The task of defining compensable events would be even
easier for manufacturers of many products-especially those that
tend to inflict simple, traumatic, easily identifiable injuries (such
as those from power tools).75
tares, in MANAGEMZNmr oF SuRGiAi, COMLwcATIONs, supra note
[60], at 699, 708.
Id. n.82, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1259 n.82.
72. "The term 'malunion' really implies union of a fracture in
a function-impairing deformity which could have been pre-
vented by more skillful management of the fracture." [Hamp-
ton, supra note 71, at 709-10.]
Id. n.83, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1259 n.83.
73. See Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 57, at 83.
74. See id. at 83-88.
75. On a point beyond the scope of this Article, perhaps the most
promising area for elective no-fault liability is owners' and occupiers'
liability insurance since smaller, nuisance claims are most likely to arise
from injuries occurring in one's house or apartment or business establish-
ment, and the automobile universe has shown that it is where such
claims abound that no-fault can be implemented most easily. The reason
this is so is that where nuisance claims abound the tort liability system
is most wasteful: more is paid for pain and suffering and more is paid
for amounts already paid from collateral sources. Both of these excess
pay-outs can be eliminated by no-fault insurance. But except for lessors
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III. NO-FAULT REFORM AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
OR UNCONSCIONABLE?
No-fault reform for medical and product injuries could be
instituted by legislation authorizing substitution of no-fault for
traditional tort liability in the case of given injuries, 76 or it could
be instituted without enabling legislation by contract between
patients and health care providers, signed before treatment, or
between consumers and product manufacturers or retailers,
signed before purchase. 77  Already hospitals contract with pa-
tients to resort to arbitration, rather than common-law litigation,
to resolve disputes arising from hospital treatment; 78 no-fault
agreements could readily be added to such arbitration contracts.
Of course, treatment should not be refused if a patient chooses
not to sign a no-fault agreement; nor should such agreements
be used for emergency cases, lacking statutory authorization.
To be sure, the argument will be made that such contracts
by health care providers, manufacturers, or retailers would be
unconstitutional if authorized by legislation,"9 or unconscionable
dealing with lessees, it will be impossible to impose such liability by
contract without enabling legislation since there is no contract in which
to incorporate the no-fault agreement. For this reason, though, elective
no-fault liability for slips and falls and other injuries should be imple-
mented in leases.
76. For draft legislation, see O'Connell, An Elective No-Fault Lia-
bility Statute, 1975 INs. L.J. 261.
77. For a discussion of the enforceability of such contracts, see
O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Liability by Contract-With or Without an
Enabling Statute, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 59, printed in slightly different form
in O'Connell, No-Fault Liability by Contract for Doctors, Manufacturers,
Retailers and Others, 1975 INs. L.J. 53.
78. See note 34 supra.
79. For extensive discussion of the constitutionality of such legisla-
tion, see O'Connell & Souk, Is It Constitutional?, in J. O'CoNNLL, supra
note 17, at 204. Basically, the arguments against the constitutionality
of an elective no-fault statute are: (1) due process is denied when com-
mon-law rights are thus abrogated, especially at the option of a potential
tortfeasor or who substitutes for common-law liability a right to elective
no-fault benefits, see id. at 205-14; and (2) equal protection is simi-
larly denied because of different treatment of similarly situated accident
victims depending once again on private elections, albeit pursuant to
statute, by potential tortfeasors. See id. at 214-23. Problems may also
arise under other constitutional provisions, such as section 54 of the Ken-
tucky Constitution: "The General Assembly shall have no power to limit
the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries
to person or property." See J. O'Connell, supra note 17, at 223-27. For
discussion of the particular circumstances under which these problems




if implemented without enabling legislation. 80 Since the con-
tracts would probably have a greater chance of being upheld by
the courts if instituted under the aegis of legislative authoriza-
tion, let us examine whether such contracts are unconscionable
as a sort of ultimate test of their validity.
In the words of Professor Arthur Leff of the Yale Law
School:
What is the function of [the] ... unconscionability concept
? Briefly, it appears to be one technique for controlling the
quality of a transaction when free market control is considered
ineffective. It is one method for substituting government regu-
lation for regulation by the parties. The theory of classical con-
tract, paralleling classical economics, was that ordinarily the
market mechanism should maximize the welfare of the parties.
... [But] no market is perfect .... First, there may be
monopolistic or oligopolistic powers in that market, either "natu-
ral," conspiratorial, or government sanctioned [as in the case of
health care providers]. Second, the information necessary for
market choice may not be available at reasonable cost with re-
spect to any particular consumer product [or service], espe-
cially when a consumer [or patient] has to process information
about a vast array of goods [or services]; consumers [or pa-
tients] notably lack the expertise that comes from buyer spe-
cialization. Third, With respect to consumer "contracts," most
of the boiler plate is about contingencies, things that will be-
come important only if the product or deal breaks down [such
as the product or service resulting in unexpected personal in-jury]. It is hard to focus attention on what should not ordi-
narily happen, or at least to focus as carefully as upon what
will happen for sure; i.e., the price and the nature of the goods
[or services]. In any event, for these and other reasons, it has
been persuasively argued that the market bargaining process
will not protect consumers from a large variety of injuries in
a huge array of transactions. And if not, some other device to
supply that protection may have to be designed. The natural
step is to look to government intervention; i.e., to invoke the
political "market" instead of the economic one to correct the
latter's alleged imperfections.
... Even having made that decision, however, one has
barely begun the intellectual struggle such an apparent insight
should set off. If the government is to intervene, what form
should that intervention take? Should it be legislative and ad-
ministrative, legislative and judicial?s1
So, one can regulate insurance contracts by administrative
rulings (through an insurance comndssioner), through legislation
(witness New York State's rigorously precise statutory delinea-
80. See note 77 supra.
81. Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd-Consumers and the
Common Law Tradition, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 349, 350-51 (1970).
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tion of insurance contract terms),82 or "by the government via
the judicial bureaucracy, on an ad hoc case-by-case basis, essen-
tially unrestrained by legislative or administrative guidance"83
(this, of course, is what courts do when they decide which con-
tract clauses are unconscionable). The premise of the market,
however, is that parties to a contract know what is best for them;
the premise of governmental intervention, including that by the
courts in ruling contracts unconscionable, is that a governmental
bureaucracy, whether administrative, legislative, or judicial,
rather than the parties, knows what is best for them.
If the courts were to strike down all elective no-fault insur-
ance contracts, they would in effect be saying that the purchase
of tort liability insurance is so much in the interest of consumers
as a class that they will not be allowed to buy any other form
of insurance. But how much sense does it really make to say
that tort liability insurance is so valuable to potential accident
victims that the market will not be allowed to substitute any
other form of insurance? Especially dubious is this position
when one takes account of how much the public seems to favor
no-fault insurance over fault insurance. The consumer move-
ment seems almost unanimous in its support of no-fault insur-
ance. 4 Keep in mind that the effect of common-law tort deci-
sions is that all buyers of goods and services must automatically
buy from manufacturers or service providers insurance policies
that cover personal injury caused by faulty or defective products
or services. Theoretically, that may well make sense, but also
keep in mind that the effect of such an insurance policy is that
(1) expenses already paid for are paid all over again and (2)
payment is based on fault or defect, with additional amounts be-
ing paid for pain and suffering, so that the premium is primarily
used for legal expenses and insurance overhead-payment is thus
usually nonexistent and, even if made, often nonutilitarian and
always long delayed.8 5 Why, then, should providers of goods
or services be precluded from experimenting with other forms
of insurance, arguably more efficient?
At least under elective no-fault insurance some providers of
goods and services would be offering an alternative to the tort
system. If it were protested that all providers of goods and serv-
82. See, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 140-74 (McKinney 1966).
83. Leff, supra note 81, at 353.
84. See, e.g., J. O'CoNwELL, THE INJURY IDUSTRY AND THE REmnmY
OF No-FAULT INsURANcE 3-4, 95-96 (1971). But see text accompanying
note 157 infra.
85. See notes 1-23 supra and accompanying text.
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ices would elect no-fault and thus leave no choice to the con-
sumer, that is no different from the present system where all
are forced into offering (or buying) insurance based on fault.
Unanimous election of no-fault would also be an indication that
the new system is universally seen by providers of goods and
services as better for them (and -presumably their customers)
than liability based on fault. If it were further protested that
providers of goods and services are likely to make a decision inim-
ical to the interests of their customers, at least in this instance,
such a criticism seems unfounded in light of the inadequacies
of the system based on tort. Should a court insist that such mar-
keting and professional decisions are unconstitutional (if made
pursuant to a statute allowing provider choice) or unconscionable
(if made without statutory authorization) ?
It is interesting to note that when the government intervenes
in, overruling or displacing market decisions,
[i]t is more active in situations where the failure of self-
protection through market mechanisms might have serious and
irreversible consequences for the buyer. For instance, where the
failure to shop carefully and intelligently might lead to death,
sickness or serious bodily injury, the government is more likely
to intervene to stipulate at least :minimum standards for the
goods.... [E].g., ... auto-safety standards .... Only rarely
does the government intervene, except through information-
generating devices like expanded notions of fraud, or through
devices like the Prospectus requirement of the Securities Act of
1933 ... when the danger is merely that the buyer will get less
than he might otherwise have received. In other words, govern-
ment is most likely to intervene directly when the risk to the
buyer goes beyond the value of the thing bargained for [; in
other words, beyond just being bilked by worthless or shoddy
goods such as a power lawn mower that won't start, one stands
to lose a foot when the mower does work. Obviously, that loss
of a foot is beyond the value of the thing bargained for (the
lawn mower).] When one looks at the cases .. . it appears,
though dimly, that the court's "using", [unconscionability] ...
may already have started, though not very consciously, imple-
menting some such criterion as "risk beyond the value of the
bargain" as an unacknowledged touchstone for those contract
clauses needing for their validation (if ever validatable) some
form of super-assent [from a court]. The clearest instance is
with respect to warranty disclaimers, where elimination by
"contract" of recourse against the seller or manufacturer means
not only that one may get defective or worthless goods, but that
one may also sustain uncompensated personal injuries.86
Note that crucial word "uncompensated." The law should
not just stop after asserting that the loss of the foot exceeds the
value of the bargain, and, therefore, the manufacturer will
86. Leff, supra note 81, at 353 n.19.
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not be allowed to bargain away his tort liability for the loss of
that foot. In effect, as we have seen, decisions such as Henning-
sen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.8 7 require the manufacturer to
sell-and the purchaser to buy-insurance for personal injury
stemming from a defect in the product.8 8 But if we are focusing
on bargains we have to ask, do we not, how good is that bargain
mandated by the judicial bureaucracy? How likely is it that the
injury will be compensated under the insurance mandated by the
courts? Is the bargain of getting tort liability insurance so
good-and the assurance of compensation so great-that the
courts should allow no other remedy or insurance to be substi-
tuted for it? Looked at that way, the answer would clearly seem
to be negative. The National Commission on Product Safety,89
after exhaustively examining the current product liability sys-
tem, opined that "[t] o advise a battered consumer to sue may
simply add insult to injury."90
Another argument in favor of permitting elective no-fault
insurance contracts is derived from history: compensation for
personal injury stemming from products, at least, has been for
a century and a half a fascinating minuet between tort and con-
tract."' First, in 1842, in order to limit payment for personal
injury, contract (specifically, the doctrine of privity) was used
in a product liability case to get around the inadequacies of tort
(specifically, the almost unlimited liability in tort to almost any-
one) ;92 then, in 1916, in order to ensure more ready payment
for personal injury, tort (specifically, liability for negligence re-
gardless of the lack of privity) was used to get around the inade-
quacies of contract (namely privity) ;93 then, once again in order
to ensure more ready payment for personal injury, contract (spe-
cifically, the doctrine of warranty) was used increasingly in
products liability cases to get around the inadequacies of tort
(specifically, such requirements as proof of negligence and the
87. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
88. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
89. The chairman of the Commission was Arnold Elkind of the New
York City Bar, a prominent personal injury lawyer.
90. NATIONAL COMM'N ON PRODUCT SAFETY, FINAL REPORT 74 (1970).
91. See Franklin, When, Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Dis-
claimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974 (1966). As
to the mixture of tort and contract in the origins of health care provider
liability, see 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIASIS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 8.03,
at 194-200 (1973).
92. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex.
1842).




absence of contributory negligence);94 then, in order to ensure
still readier payment, tort (specifically, the doctrine of strict lia-
bility) was used to get around the inadequacies of contract (spe-
cifically, such requirements as privity and notice under the doc-
trine of warranty);95 so now, in turn, to ensure readier payment
still, contract (specifically, elective no-fault liability as a war-
ranty) should be used to get around the inadequacies of tort (spe-
cifically, such requirements as proo.E of defect under the doctrine
of strict liability).96
Bear in mind that the proposal for elective no-fault insurance
follows closely the provisions of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Acci-
dent Reparations Act (UVVARA), the no-fault auto law drafted
at the behest of and endorsed by the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws.9 7  Elective no-fault allows those liable in tort for
personal injuries to substitute to tfae maximum extent possible
no-fault benefits for out-of-pocket losses.9 8  Concerning this
trade-off, consider the following remarks of Professor Robert E.
Keeton:
(1) Under the existing [auto tort] system, the package is
$25,000 per person/$50,000 per accident liability insurance cov-
erage, with the assurance (by unirsured motorist coverage) of
the collectibility of one's valid claims against other drivers up
to at least that same amount. This package ... [provides]
each person with the right to recover for both economic loss
and [pain and suffering] when there is a valid claim based on
negligence, but no right to recover either kind of damages in
other cases....
(2) The other package is UMVARA, with guaranteed life-
time coverage, no overall limit and relatively liberal internal
94. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs § 97 (4th ed. 1971).
95. See id. § 98.
96. See O'Connell, No-Fault Liability by Contract for Doctors,
Manufacturers, Retailers and Others, 1975 INs. L.J. 531, 541.
97. NATIONAL CoNF. OF CoiVnf'Rs oxr UNIFORm STATE LAws, UNIFORMI
MOTOR VEHICLE AccIDENT EPARATIoNs ACT (Nov. 1, 1972 ed.).
98. See note 76 supra. Even if contracts are used without enabling
legislation, the provisions of the no-fault draft bill should be the basis
on which insurers draft elective no-fault provisions. In addition, ap-
proval of elective no-fault insurance contracts by an insurance commis-
sioner might well be viewed as necessary under the law of some states.
R. KEETON, INsURANcE LAw-BAsIc TEXT 71-72, 543-45, 550-53 (1971). A
regulator might well use the terms of -;he draft bill as a basis for pre-
scribing, proscribing, or permitting specific policy provisions. Note that
approval of elective no-fault insurance contracts by an insurance com-
missioner would probably enhance the likelihood of a contract being up-
held by the courts, in that approval by a public official is arguably incon-
sistent with unconscionability. For more on safeguards against unfair




limits ($200 per week for wage loss and a semi-private rather
than a private room when hospitalization is needed). Subject
to these internal limits, this package provides total coverage for
economic losses sustained in automobile accidents regardless of
negligence, but no chance of recovering general damages for
noneconomic detriment (such as pain and suffering) unless the
injury is severe.
Which package would you choose? 99
To further illustrate the huge amounts now being misspent
under traditional tort liability that could be shifted to prompt
payment of out-of-pocket losses under no-fault insurance, con-
sider the following figures from Michigan: Coverage under
Michigan's no-fault auto laws pay unlimited medical expenses,
plus $36,000 of wage losses, and residual tort liability (be-
yond the tort exemption under the no-fault law) of $20,000, all
for a cost no greater-and substantially less for those willing to
forego payment if already paid from Blue Cross or employer-
financed sick leave, for example-than the costs of only $20,000
under traditional tort liability coverage.
As suggested earlier, because of the difficulty of identifying
all insured events we cannot mandate the no-fault bargain across
the board to all medical or product injuries. 10 0 But since the
advantages of no-fault protection are so dramatic compared to
liability based on fault or defect, why not allow anyone poten-
tially liable in tort to put the advantages of no-fault to work?
Recently, the prestigious Special Advisory Panel on Medical Mal-
practice, appointed by Governor Carey of New York and chaired
by President William McGill of Columbia University, stated as
its first of 17 recommendations:
Inasmuch as the present tort law/liability insurance system
for medical malpractice will eventually break down and costs
have and will continue to rise to unacceptable levels, fundamen-
tal reform of the present tort law/liability insurance system
should be undertaken. ... [T]he overriding concern should be
to create a system of compensation for adverse medical outcomes
resulting from medical treatment, whether or not caused by neg-
ligence.10 1
99. R. Keeton, Compensation Systems and Utah's No-Fault Statute,
1973 UTAH L. REv. 383, 399. For further similarly persuasive arguments
based on comparisons between tort liability insurance protection and that
afforded under a federal no-fault standards bill currently before Con-
gress, see Hearings on H. Con. Res. 116 Before the Subcomm. on Com-
merce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 114, pt. 1, 402-19 (1975) (testimony of
Robert Keeton) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
100. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
101. STATE OF NEW YORK, SPEcIAL ADvisoRY PANEL ON MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE, REPORT 4, 57-63 (1976); N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1976, at 11, col. 1.
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(The panel's report did not advert specifically to no-fault, but ac-
cording to the New York Times:
Supporters of the Panel recommendation have shied away
from the no-fault label because they feel it will frighten off the
insurance companies and lawyers who fought no-fault automo-
bile insurance .... 102
There are at least two responses, however, to any attempt to
shy away from the label "no-fault." First, if that term accurately
describes the plan, there is little, if any, hope that this well-known
term can be avoided. The press and the public will inevitably call
the proposed reform by such a widely known label, if it fits. It
is not without significance that the proponents of no-fault insur-
ance did not invent the term; it was apparently coined by the
press as a convenient term that would fit into headlines. Once
introduced by the press, it took on a life of its own for both
the press and the public, and no term could have supplanted it. 10 3
Second, if one is urging reform, perhaps the greatest advantage
102. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1976, at 38, col. 3. The Times also
reported that an additional fear of the no-fault label was that "people
will feel that doctors guilty of negligence will not be penalized." Id.
As to this objection, see notes 145-59 infra and accompanying text.
103. Perhaps the following exchange illustrates something of the
problem. A letter from a very thoughtful and eminent law professor,
long interested in automobile insurance reform, was received by propo-
nents of no-fault automobile insurance in October of 1970:
Dear... :
Along with the continuing newspaper discussion of the ad-
vances and distortions of no-fault insurance, I saw a bumper
sticker the other day! It said "No fault no pay." I surmise
that is a production of the Trial Lawyers Association.
Anyway, it led me to reflect that "no-fault" is not a very
positive kind of slogan, and that it may also have been captured
and diluted. How about "self-protection insurance"? This
phrase has obvious connotations of self-reliance and security. It
can also easily be put in an active voice: "Insure to protect
yourself."




Concerning your provocative note. .. on another name for
reform than "no-fault" insurance, I have found that one does
not control these things at all ....
Rather, for reasons that are not at all clear, newspaper peo-
ple and then the public latch on to a given name and one is
stuck with it. The most important thing to my mind at this
point is that reform is identified by a catch phrase that millions
of people recognize. As you can probably appreciate, that is
an inestimably important step. Once you've achieved it, almost
no matter how disadvantageous you think the term to be, one
is ill-advised to try to change the terminology because (a) you
give away the big advantage of identification and (b) the
chances are overwhelming you won't succeed in changing the
name adopted anyway.
All I am trying to say is that if this were a rational process,
I might go along with you in trying to steer the terminology
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one can have, next to a valid idea, is widespread recognition of
the substance of the proffered idea. In the commercial world,
enterprises would gladly spend millions-perhaps hundreds of
millions-to gain the kind of instant recognition that the term
"no-fault" now excites in the United States, and indeed all over
the world. To try to avoid its use for an idea of which it is
descriptive seems both naive and wasteful.) Elective no-fault
may be a controversial and somewhat complicated reform, but
unconstitutional and unconscionable it is not.
IV. TORT COSTS AS THE BASE LINE FOR REFORM
One objection to elective no-fault insurance is that it uses
the costs of the present tort system as a base line. In other
words, it is the cost of the present system that sets the param-
eters for the operation of no-fault insurance in that it is expected
that providers of goods and services will check their tort liability
costs against the possible costs of no-fault insurance. Based on
that comparison, they will decide whether it is "profitable" for
them to elect no-fault insurance. In the words of Professor
Havighurst:
[E]lective no-fault, having its base line in the existing system
and being designed by providers primarily for their own benefit,
would be viable only to the extent that physicians perceive a
benefit to themselves, in terms of cost and avoidance of unpleas-
antness, in establishing compensable categories. 0 4
Professors Walter Blum and the late Harry Kalven of the Univer-
sity of Chicago Law School have more extensively criticized this
common-law base line as a limitation of no-fault plans:
The upshot of a [no-fault] plan is to effect a shift from
a redress perspective to an insurance perspective. As a re-
suit, one is liberated from being controlled by. . . common law
[damages] .... and even from being much guided by them.
. .. Are the [new] award levels to be set on the assump-
tion that there is a more or less fixed aggregate pool to be
distributed as unconditional [no-fault] reparations to the vic-
tins, or on the assumption that the size of the pool is not a
given, but is to be determined by notions of what the award
levels ought to be? It is our impression that in almost all dis-
cussions [of no-fault] it is implicit that there is a more or less
determined limit to the pool, and that this sense of limit is




As a further illustration, the name Professor Keeton and I applied to our
original plan, "Basic Protection," was rarely used by others.
104. Remarks of Clark Havighurst, Conference, supra note 19, in
Havighurst, supra note 58, 1975 DuKE L.J. at 1256.
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perhaps the controlling factor in determining the award struc-
ture.
One does not have to look far for an explanation. A chief
point of rhetoric in the advocacy of plans has been that they
will offer a better product, dollar for dollar, than the motorist
is now buying; in brief, under a plan, a motorist's total insurance
premiums will not increase, but will in all likelihood decrease.
It follows that the maximum size of the pool to be distributed
in unconditional [no-fault] awards has to be set by the size of
the "pool" that is generated under the common law tort-insur-
ance system. Whatever the need to acknowledge the political
imperatives, an anomaly lurks here. The award potential under
a plan is being largely determined by a factor which is irrele-
vant to the aspirations of a plan. The aggregate amount the
common law "collects" for distribution to victims is crucially
affected by the fact that the law is not intended to pay all vic-
tims, but only those who qualify under common law liability
rules. A principle point of every plan in mandating uncondi-
tional [no-fault] reparations is to reject those common law cri-
teria of eligibility for compensation. Yet in effect the outcome
is to permit these rejected criteria to limit how much a plan will
do for victims. This almost automatic acceptance of the size of
the common law "pool" as a limitation may be a key clue in
explaining why the discussion .. . under [no-fault] plans has
been so little concerned with theory. Once it is assumed that
the size of the pool is already determined, many genuine issues
• . . are readily short-circuited.
... Throughout [this Article] we have recognized that the
auto [no-fault] plan is a new institutional concept. Something
new has been brought in to replace something old. At the heart
of every plan is the replacement o- conditional redress [based
on fault] keyed to corrective justice, by unconditional [no-fault]
reparations keyed to insurance. One might have thought that
a change so conceived would have been able to break sharply
with the common law and its legacy of traditions, expectations,
and concepts. The most interesting impression with which we
are left is that the common law, even in the case of the most
ambitious plans, still makes its presence felt. Once again, Mait-
land's aphorism is corroborated: auto [no-fault] plans, too,
might be said to be ruled from the grave.
... The most obvious instance, made explicit in the public
rhetoric, is tying the cost of the new arrangement to the cost
of the old. Almost universally the base line for assessing the
cost of a plan to the motorist is provided by the cost to him
of the common law tort-insurance system. Use of the common
law as a baseline is exemplified again in justifying ... the limi-
tations on reparations. This time the reference is not to what
the common law costs, but to what the common law affords as
redress. The justification may be seen in terms of a "bargain"
in which old common law rights are traded for new uncondi-
tional [no-fault] reparation rights-a justification which would
be without foundation in the absence of any common law
rights. 05
105. Blum & Kalven, Ceilings, Costs, and Compulsion in Auto Com-
pensation Legislation, 1973 UTAH L. REv. 341, 346-47, 376. While these
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Of course the point is wel taken; even more than with auto
plans, elective no-fault insurance plans for medical malpractice
and products liability use the present tort liability cost as a base
line-but not necessarily for every compensable event. It might
well be that providers of goods and services would, on occasion
at least, decide to include no-fault benefits that would increase
costs, on the ground that they and their customers/patients are
better off with such expeditious compensation. A doctor might
decide, for example, that automatic payment for additional costs
attributable to complications arising from a thyroid operation
merit at least offering the patient a higher cost option for insur-
ance.106 A manufacturer might similarly consider that auto-
matic payment of benefits for amputation resulting from the
use of his power tool justifies a higher price.107  Admittedly,
given strong beliefs that present liability insurance costs are too
high, this may not happen too often. On the other hand, feelings
that costs are too high under present common-law tort liability
may well stem from the sense of how little anyone but lawyers
benefits from those high costs; when a better insurance option
is available providers of goods and services may well sense their
customers/patients will be willing to pay more for better insur-
ance protection.
Nevertheless, this question of tort liability costs as the base
line for no-fault insurance is worthy of examination. There were
many no-fault auto plans proposed between 1932 and 1965, but
none really focused on what would be the costs vis-h-vis the tort
system.'08 Not surprisingly, it was only with the detailed struc-
turing of auto no-fault in such a way that actuarial opinions
could offer reassurance that costs would not rise and indeed
would probably decline that the no-fault idea took hold.10 9 With-
out offering assurances as to cost, a reformer was in the position
of going to a legislature and saying, "I can improve auto insur-
remarks were addressed to auto no-fault plans, they apply equally to
elective no-fault for other forms of accidents.
106. Whether the higher price would be mentioned to-and bar-
gained over with-the patient would probably, in practice, turn on
whether the particular doctor now mentions-and bargains over-differ-
ences in expense for various modes of treatment. Doctors often don't
do that-but dentists do.
107. On the reluctance of merchants to publicize potential injuries
from the use of their products, however, see J. O'CONNELL, supra note
17, at 100.
108. Cf. O'Connell, Industry and the Academic Researcher, 53 IowA
L. REv. 1269, 1277-79 (1968).
109. E.g., Harwayne, Insurance Costs of Basic Protection Plan in
Michigan, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 479, 486-87, in Caisis iN CAR IwsURAxc. 119,
126-27 (R. Keeton, J. O'Connell, & J. McCord eds. 1968).
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ance, but it will cost more," to which a ready, if simplistic, reply
might have been "Who couldn't?" It was the offering of better
insurance protection at the same or lower price that caught the
public eye. Remember that auto insurance everywhere is,
in effect, a compulsory purchase-as is, in effect, product liability
and medical malpractice insurance. Thus changes in the insur-
ance system that increase costs are seen as very offensive since
all are required to pay more regardless of their desires. Thus,
in turn, using present costs as the base line for reform does not
seem so illogical.
Elective no-fault insurance seems to evoke essentially two
main (inconsistent, but understandable) fears: first, insureds
will elect compensable events in such a way that compensation
to customers/patients will be drastically and unfairly reduced,
compared to tort litigation; second, the costs of paying on a no-
fault basis will be drastically increased, compared to tort litiga-
tion.
A. AN UNFAI REDUcTION IN COMPENSATION?
As to the fear of reduced compensation, Professor Keeton
and others have pointed to the enormously increased pay-outs
possible under no-fault insurance compared to the tort sys-
tem. 10 Professors Blum and Kalven have analyzed it this way
with reference to no-fault auto plans:
It is often argued that the internal savings in administering
unconditional [no-fault] reparations, as measured against ad-
ministering conditional [fault/defect] reparations, should be suf-
ficient to pay for the additional coverage of victims ineligible
for recovery at common law. The ratio of savings to pay-out
declines as the amount of reparations goes up. It may be possi-
ble to locate a sort of optimal point for a ceiling-the point at
which the internal savings just meet the pay-out on coverage
of the additional victims. It is not clear, however, that this line
of thinking has ever been [explicitly] used as a rationale for a
[no-fault auto] . . . plan."1
But, of course, that is precisely the line of thinking under-
girding elective no-fault liability-that providers of goods and
services will be encouraged to find the optimal point "at which
the internal savings just meet the pay-out on coverage of the
additional victims."' 2  Critics of elective no-fault, however,
have pointed to the distinct possibility that insureds will not nec-
110. See note 143 infra.




essarily be encouraged to find that particular optimal point.
Rather, insureds will be induced to carefully pick as compensable
events those accidents likely to have already resulted in tort ver-
dicts or settlements, thereby eliminating collateral payment and
payment for pain and suffering while not greatly, if at all, in-
creasing the pay-out to previously ineligible victims. In other
words, they will be inclined to find an optimal point that elim-
inates tort pay-outs but fails to increase nontort pay-outs.
That costs may be cut too much at the price of eliminat-
ing valid tort claims raises a variant of what Professor Robert
Keeton has spoken of in another context as the cost/equity di-
lemma." 3 We cut costs at the price of doing equity. But keep
in mind that the equity that is sacrificed is the "equity" of the
tort system, which, in the aggregate, provides precious little
equity. Nevertheless, Dean Richard Roddis of the University of
Washington Law School has expressed the fear of a skewed cost/
equity bargain as follows:
Uncontrolled experimentation by elective no-fault could be
most unfortunate from a consumer standpoint. The providers
will make a series of calculated economic choices about what
to cover and their choices may not be the ones that I, as a health
care consumer, would like to have made. At the least, I suggest
that any elective no-fault system should subject the scope and
terms of provider elections to external public control calculated
to achieve reasonable uniformity, avoid confusion and conflicts
among the elections of different providers in a particular treat-
ment situation, and prevent unreasonable limitations in the elec-
tions." 4
Dean Roddis, then, would seem more comfortable if the legisla-
ture or insurance commissioner (presumably upon legislative del-
egation) defined compensable events under the no-fault system
so that an optimal point more favorable to customers/patients
would be ensured.
The question can be starkly posed: Given the admittedly
difficult job of defining compensable events (which drives us to
elective no-fault in the first place), whom do you trust more to
do the job? A legislature and/or government agency on the one
hand or providers of goods and services on the other? One can
make a strong case for starting with the providers of goods and
services since they are in a better position to decide what is best
for them and, their customers/patients than are the wisest gov-
113. R. KEEToN, VENTURING To Do JUSTCE: REFORMING PRIVATE
LAw 136-39 (1969).
114. Roddis, Could No-Fault Malpractice Insurance Work?, MED.
WoRLD NEWS, Oct. 6, 1975, at 102, 103.
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ernment officials. Granted that there will be some overreaching,
we will, on the whole, get a more flexible working arrangement
through decentralization by letting the market for goods and
services determine the optimal level of compensation for injuries
from goods and services.115
Admittedly there is already a great deal of distrust of the
manner in which, for example, health care providers decide on
appropriate treatment. This deep distrust has indeed led to the
establishment of so-called Professional Standards Review Organ-
izations (PSROs), ordained by congressional enactment.1"
Under the statute, regional review boards are being established,
each "charged with defining acceptable norms of medical aid
and insuring that individual physicians and hospitals meet
specified standards of performance."'' Each PSRO develops
guidelines for a given illness, injury, or health condition, spec-
ifying, for instance, when hospitalization is necessary and the
appropriate length of stay requirced in the course of proper
care."1 8 On the other hand, PSEOs are the subject of bitter
criticism by the medical profession on the ground that such mas-
sive bureaucratic intervention (once again, it will be noted, sup-
posedly to correct the market between health care providers and
their patients)11 9 will not end up benefiting patients.120  Pro-
fessor Calabresi has recently commented that never before have
115. We reach here application of a principle of intense contempo-
rary controversy. President Kingman Brewster of Yale, in delivering
the annual Churchill Lecture to the English Speaking Union of the Com-
monwealth on Thanksgiving Day, 1975, in London, said:
[T]he general attitude which should inform our attack [on the
problem of preserving "the rights of Englishmen," namely the
rights of free people] . . . should [first] exhaust ways of en-
couraging private decisions in the public interest before re-
sorting to government allocations or regulations.
Brewster, The Rights of Englishmen, Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 1975, at 6, cols.
3-6.
Similarly, United States Ambassador to the United Nations Daniel
Patrick Moynihan, in a speech at about the same time, stated: "What is
going on is a systematic effort to create an international society in which
government is the one and only legitimate institution." Moynihan, A
Diplomat's Rhetoric, HAPER's, Jan. 19713, at 40, 41. See notes 166-75 infra
and accompanying text.
116. Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, tit. 2, § 249F(b), 86
Stat. 1429 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320c (Supp. IV, 1974).
117. Winsten, Imposing Controls on Doctors, Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1973,
at 14, cols. 3-6.
118. For a good survey of PSROs, see A. GosmiE, PSRO's: THE
LAW AD THE HEALTH CoNsumER (1975).
119. See text accompanying note 81 supra.




such extensive result-oriented safety regulations of conduct as
PSROs ended up working. "We end up," he said, "with building
codes.' 1 2 1 In the case of PSROs selecting appropriate treatment
-as with selecting compensable events when treatment goes
awry-it is by no means clear that a governmental official ought
necessarily to step between the doctor and his patient.122
Of course, the choice is not simply a stark one between mar-
ket or governmental determinations of compensable events. Ar-
guably, an insurance commissioner's approval will be required
before elective no-fault insurance policies are marketed. 2  In-
deed, I have also suggested that advisory committees of profes-
sional and business persons should be established to assist an in-
surance commissioner in approving given types of elective no-
fault policies.124 Moreover, elective no-fault contracts will be
subject not only to administrative scrutiny by insurance commis-
sioners but to judicial scrutiny by courts as they apply the doc-
trine of unconscionability to identify particular instances of over-
reaching by providers of goods and services. 2 5
121. Remarks of Guido Calabresi, Conference, supra note 19. See
notes 137-41 infra and accompanying text. For a detailed description,
incidentally, of the corruption now thriving in New York City as a result
of building codes and other safety regulations, see N.Y. Times, June 26,
1972, at 1, cols. 1-3; id., June 27, 1972, at 1, cols. 6-7.
122. A clear example of where we have resorted to governmental
regulation, rather than physician discretion, in health care matters is in
the prescription of new drugs. Under the Pure Food and Drug Act, 21
U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970), no drug can be prescribed by a physician until
it has been tested and approved by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). Id. § 355. With PSROs, we are, in effect, moving to arguably
similar governmentally imposed constraints on physician discretion. But
there seems to be strong evidence that such governmental restraints on
drug prescriptions have cost more in adverse effects than they have pro-
vided in benefits to the public. Studies by Sam Peltzman and Dr. Wil-
liam Wardell indicate that, on balance, we have suffered more in keep-
ing beneficial drugs off (or delaying them from) the market than we
have benefited in banning unsafe drugs. Indeed, for all the restraint
"it is not at all clear that present regulations would prevent a thalido-
mide from being marketed." V. FucHs, WHO SHALL LIVn? HEALTH, Eco-
NONIVCS AND SOCIAL CHOICE 115-19 (1974) (citing Peltzman, An Evaluation
of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug Amendments, 81
J. POL. EcoN. 1049 (1973) and Wardell, Introduction of New Therapeutic
Drugs in the United States and Great Britain: An International Com-
parison, 14 CLiN. PHARm. & TaPu'. 773 (1973)).
123. See note 98 supra.
124. J. O'CoNNELL, supra note 17, at 155. Indeed, most of Professor
Havighurst's criteria might be used. See notes 58-59 supra and accom-
panying text.
125. It will be essential for courts to weigh the fairness of the bar-
gain as of a time before injury-and as it applies to consumers/patients
as a group. J. O'CoNNEL, supra note 17, at 118-19.
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An additional fear related to overreaching by health care
providers, in particular, is the fear (reflected in Professor Havig-
hurst's fifth criterion-2Vould an incentive to minimize the oc-
currence of this complication [as a compensable event] bias the
choice of treatment in unfortunate ways?")-26 that doctors
might skew the treatment offered to lessen the likelihood of in-
surance payment being required. If, for example, no-fault bene-
fits seem particularly likely to be paid to a given patient follow-
ing a certain procedure, a different procedure might therefore
be employed.
Here, too, however, participation of the insurance commis-
sioner 127 in applying a criterion such as that developed by Pro-
fessor Havighurst would aid in avoiding allowance of manipu-
lable compensable events that would entail such skewed treat-
ment. Furthermore, skewed treatment itself might be the sub-
ject of a malpractice suit. Finally, query the degree to which
we need be uniquely worried that doctors are going to improperly
skew their treatment for the purposes of insurance any more
than they will skew treatment for other improper purposes.128
In the case, then, of improper treatment to increase fees or to
lessen insurance pay-out, there is cause for some fear of unethical
behavior, but structuring bureaucratic remedies to prevent such
behavior ought not to be lightly undertaken.
What operates here is the traditional tripartite spectrum for
controlling improper behavior: Conscience/Market/Fiat. As
economist James Buchanan has so succinctly put it: "The market
economy's socio-political function is that of minimizing the neces-
sity of resorting to internal ethical constraints on human be-
havior and/or external legal-governmental-political restric-
tions."' 29  To continue our focus on the health care provider,
126. Remarks of Clark Havighurst, Conference, supra note 19, at n.71,
in Havighurst, note 58, 1975 DuKE L.J., at 1256.
127. See notes 123-24 supra and accompanying text.
128. Recently, for example, a prominent physician urged that sur-
geons be receiving salaries rather than charging fees that might tempt
them to perform unnecessary operations. Dr. George Crile, Jr., emeritus
consultant in surgery of the Cleveland Clinic, stated, "A surgeon deciding
whether or not a patient should be operated on is acting as a judge.
When he knows he will be paid $500 if he operates and nothing if he
doesn't, the surgeon is faced with a conflict of interest." Chicago Sun-
Times, Dec. 14, 1975, at 98, cols. 1-5. But what, for example, will be
the effect of reimbursement only by salary on the availability of neces-
sary surgery?
129. Buchanan, Good Economics-Bad Law, 60 VA. L. Rnv. 483, 486
(1975).
That the parties should be allowed to vary by contract the manner
in which the law would otherwise impose loss is pivotal to the seminal
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we find there exists already a great deal of ethical constraint
on human behavior. In the words of Harvard economist Kenneth
Arrow:
The medical profession's code of ethics may not be universally
followed, but is practiced widely enough to create a popular pre-
sumption that each doctor acts with the patient's welfare in
mind-that he will not, say, order unnecessary tests or opera-
tions. The code protects patients, to be sure, but it also benefits
doctors by maintaining the public's trust in the entire profes-
sion.13 0
Similarly, according to Harvard sociologist Nathan Glazer: "In
all systems, one must depend heavily on the professional ethic
of the doctor to provide good and responsible care."'u 1
In any case, of course, we do not depend on ethical con-
straints alone for anyone in our society. Even so, granted that
the market for health care providers is very imperfect, 32 I would
nevertheless be cautious about deciding that the market, coupled
with ethical constraints, is so inadequate that on the whole it
theories of Professor Ronald Coase of the University of Chicago Law
School. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & EcoN. 1 (1960).
See also Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL
STUDIEs 13 (1972). Under the Coase theorem, optimal allocation of re-
sources need not depend on law-imposed rules (whether by court, legis-
lature or administrative agency). Rather, regardless of the manner in
which the law imposes liability for losses, if the parties are allowed to
bargain over reshifting the loss, they will arrive at an optimum alloca-
tion of resources. Coase assumes no transaction costs-which include,
for example, information costs, as well as the costs of lawyers or others
in negotiating over the redistribution of losses between the parties. But
that "fairly heroic" assumption of no transaction costs, see Gilmore,
Products Liability: A Commentary, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 103, 105 (1970),
does not alter the brilliance of Coase's insight. And, for our particular
purpose, the transaction costs to producers of goods and services in bar-
gaining over compensation rights with their customers/patients, with
whom they are already in a contractual relationship, would be relatively
low.
Thus, to the extent the courts refuse to allow bargaining to reshift
losses imposed by law, the more they blunt the parties' attempts to ar-
rive at a more sensible solution and allocation of resources than may
have been arrived at by merely relying on the law. To be sure, there
is the danger that the parties will then arrive at a grossly inequitable
bargain. The crucial question thus becomes which does one trust more-
governmental fiat or private bargaining? It is the thesis of this Article,
of course, that the imposition of personal injury liability under the tort
system has proved to be so socially counterproductive that the Coase
theorem must be applied: the courts should be receptive to more effi-
cient arrangements worked out by the parties themselves.
130. Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1974, at 16, col 3.
131. Glazer, Perspectives on Health Care, 31 PuB. INT. 110, 122
(1973).
132. See V. FucHs, supra note 122, at 62, 102.
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need be overbalanced by further tight, restrictive governmental
controls either prescribing or proscribing norms for (1) treat-
ment or (2) payment for injury arising from treatment.
In significant measure, then, rejection of elective no-fault in-
surance or a corresponding insistence that compensable events
initially be defined by a legislature or insurance commis-
sioner might replicate the fallacy of the courts if they were to
strike down any and all elective no-fault contracts as contracts
of adhesion or, if authorized by statute, as unconstitutional. 133
In both cases, resort would be had to governmental fiat rather
than the market to define compensable events. In each instance,
a governmental agency (the courts or the legislature or an insur-
ance commissioner) would be insisting that the line protecting
the consumer/patient be drawn at a certain place-and, more spe-
cifically, at a point other than where providers of goods and serv-
ices (who, in the aggregate, have to think about pleasing the con-
sumer/patient) might have drawn it. All I'm suggesting is that
-at least to start with-it might be best to rely primarily on
providers of goods and services to draw that line at an appropri-
ate place (with some relatively loose-and tolerant-supervision
from courts and insurance commissioners), even though they will
make some mistakes (and probably in their own favor). In the
words of economist Harold Demsetz, speaking at a conference on
the economics of products liability:
We would like to go on the premise that freedom of action is
something that is good. We would ]ike to have it produced, but
it is not producible without costs. One of the costs of producing
freedom is that people are going to make mistakes in using their
freedom. Even from their own viewpoint they are going to
make mistakes.
. . . It is not [, however,] a question of no mistakes versus
some mistakes[;] it is a question of having mistakes of one kind
versus mistakes of another kind. Obviously, no one has perfect
knowledge.' 3 4 Somehow you must decide when you are going
to stop trying to rectify the mistakes that arise from people's
exercise of freedom. And maybe the line is not drawn in the
right place. Maybe you want to shove it one way or another,
but merely citing the fact that some people [make] . . . mistakes
133. See notes 81-100 supra and accompanying text.
134. Economist George Stigler has observed: "We [talk] .. . about
how the market acquires information and how people react to it, but
on the other hand, [one cannot] . . . presume that the legislature gets
free, accurate, and immediate information on new developments and that
it has an efficient bureaucracy to enforce its policies." Remarks of
George Stigler, AAS-AEA Conference on Products Liability, in Manne,
Edited Transcript of AAS-AEA Conference on Products Liability, 38 U.
Cur. L. REv. 117, 134 (1970).
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that. . . hurt third parties is not in itself a convincing argument
to me that we ought to draw the line someplace else.13 5
In thus relying on the marketplace, one echoes the senti-
ments of many economists-and others-who question ever more
regulation of the marketplace. At the same products liability
conference, Melvin Reder, a Stanford University economist, ar-
gued as follows:
Part of what the economists have been saying is in fact what
the students have been saying. No "in loco parentis." What we
are saying is that, given the way people get information, they
are going to do as good a job, as far as they are concerned, as
some other person or agency can do for them. However poor
this may be, the alternative to having individuals make their
own individual decisions is to have them made by some other
mechanism, and, in general, what we [economists] are saying
is that in practice most people will indicate that ... this is in-
ferior.1SG
As to mistakes stemming from governmental fiat, especially
in the area of insurance, Dean Spencer Kimball of the University
of Wisconsin, the country's leading authority on insurance regu-
lation, has characterized the "typical American insurance code
[of laws as] a rubbish heap without parallel in the law-making
of modern man.' u 7 And Professor Robert Keeton has been
quick to point out that insurance terms dictated by public fiat
are by no means necessarily framed in the public interest:
To say that a policy form is prescribed by statute or by ad-
ministrative regulation is not to say that the initiative for modi-
fication ... is... with the legislature or administrator. In fact
the initiative is more often elsewhere.
[W~ith respect to forms prescribed by administrative reg-
ulation [for example] it appears that proposals for change
more often come from insurers than from any other source, in-
cluding the office of the administrator.... [T]he administra-
tor gets most of his information about new needs through insur-
ers, and in most instances his action on proposed forms is based
to a large extent on information presented by them in support
of proposed changes.138
A good example of the public interest in insurance matters
being perverted by governmental fiat lies in legislative and ad-
ministrative prohibitions across the country against the writing
of group auto insurance-insurance that normally would be pro-
vided automatically as a part of one's employment, with the
premiums paid in whole or in part by the employer. Despite
the fact that the greatest percentage of health insurance in the
United States is sold under such group policies-with similarly
135. Remarks of Harold Demsetz, id. at 138-39.
136. Id. at 138.
137. Kimball, Introduction: Unfinished Business in Insurance Reg-
ulation, Symposium on Insurance Regulation, 1969 WIs. L. REV. 1019.
138. R. KEEToN, INSURANCE LAW-BASIC TEXT 71 (1971).
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huge amounts of life insurance being sold in the same manner-
"[g]roup merchandising of automobile insurance is almost un-
known in the United States."'1 39 Supposedly, prohibitions against
group auto insurance are designed to protect the public, but, in
fact, they are a naked example of featherbedding by insurance
agents (fearful of losing commissions) and small, local auto in-
surance companies (fearful of losing business to large multi-line
national companies who already write group life and health).
Dean Kimball and his colleague, Herbert Denenberg, have la-
beled the theoretical underpinning of these restrictive rules,
which are supposedly in the public interest, as "silly"'140 and
"absurd"'141 -the rules nevertheless were universally adopted. 42
The point is, if doctors and insurance companies are intent on
ripping off the public, insurance regulations may be a thin shield
of protection.
B. AN UNMANAGEABLE INcREAsE 3w COSTS?
Some fear exists that, far from costing too little (with con-
comitant unfairness to those who should be paid), elective no-
fault insurance will cost too much. Again, in the words of Dean
Roddis:
I doubt that an adequate no-fault program for medical
'maloccurrence" compensation will cost providers or their insur-
ers less ... [I]ndeed, it probably will cost more than the pres-
ent system ....
• ..If the elections result in an acceptably broad net of no-
fault coverage, then I surmise that the total dollars paid in
claims will be as much as and probably even greater than at
present. I do not dislike such a result for I suspect that there
are a great many people now who experienced an adverse result
from the treatment process and should have been accorded com-
pensation for economic loss but did not receive it.143
139. Hearings on S. Res. 233 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 14, at 8323 (1968) (testimony of Bernard Webb).
140. S. KMBALL & H. DENENBERG, MASS MARETING OF PROPERTY
A LiABRI INsu A~cE 62 (1970) (U.S. Dep't of Transportation Auto-
mobile Insurance and Compensation Study).
141. National Underwriter: Prop. & Cas. Ins. Ed., April 10, 1970, at
50.
142. See note 140 supra passim.
143. Roddis, supra note 114. For another pessimistic view of the
costs of no-fault medical maloccurrence insurance compared to present
medical malpractice premiums, see R. Keeton, Compensation for Medical
Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 590 (1973). But, of course, as medical mal-
practice premiums skyrocket, the attraction of elective no-fault insurance
also increases dramatically, in that more and more funds are available
to be shifted from fault to no-fault payment.
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But this, of course, is precisely the virtue of the elective fea-
ture of no-fault insurance. As Forbes magazine has reported,
"[Elective no-fault] . .. can be applied where it works and ig-
nored where it doesn't. An accurate check on costs and benefits
can be kept at each step of the way.1 14 4 Indeed, since by defini-
tion there is no compulsion to offer such coverage, it lends itself
perfectly to the so-called "stop loss" device under which, once
insurers have committed a given amount of loss reserves to no-
fault payment, they need not offer any further no-fault contracts.
That way insurers and insureds need not fear the uncertainties
normally accompanying novel and untried coverages, especially
those mandated by statute or regulation.
V. THE EFFECT OF ELECTIVE NO-FAULT
ON DETERRENCE
While recognizing that the present system of tort liability
ill serves deterrence of unsafe medicine, for example, many will
nonetheless insist that any substitute system must clearly lead
to deterrence. Here, too, is an issue of real bite. Since several
observers have already expressed fears that unless a no-fault
compensation system as applied to medical injuries can be seen
as a quality control device, it will either not get off the ground
or fail to function properly, the following analysis will focus on
medical malpractice. But most of the points are applicable to
products liability as well. Those who fear the effect of no-fault
insurance on deterrence have no illusions that the present tort
system is effective in encouraging quality control. Nevertheless,
they fear that if other quality-assurance incentives are not sub-
stituted for the loss of the in terrorem feature of malpractice law,
elimination or significant weakening of the common-law fault
system may prove difficult despite the clear benefits to be de-
rived. Such fears are often expressed at conferences and hear-
ings on medical malpractice when a switch from fault to no-fault
insurance is proposed. Professor Havighurst's original proposal
for Medical Adversity No-Fault Medical Maloccurrence Insur-
ance (written with Lawrence Tancredi) had as its primary em-
phasis forcing the compensation scheme to function as an in-
centive to encourage quality control. His subsequent approach,
reflected in his conference remarks, is significantly less theoreti-
cal and more practically oriented, but is still focused on qual-
ity control. 145 And, in the words of Dr. John Ball of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare:
144. Sue! Sue!, FORBES, Sept. 1, 1975, at 63, 64.
145. See notes 57-60 supra and accompanying text.
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In its most basic sense, [liability for medical malpractice] ...
acts as a control on the quality of medical care in that the pa-
tient, unsatisfied with a medical care outcome, can sue the pro-
vider of care. Thus, malpractice is a mechanism of control on
the quality of outcomes of care, perhaps the only such control.
It is, of course, generally accepted that it is not a good control,
and it may owe its existence as a control in that it is the only
such mechanism at that end of the spectrum of care with which
the consumer is most concerned.
Aside from its historical background in tort laws, [the]
malpractice [claims system] may exist in medical care in a sense
because it is the only game in town. That is, it is the only con-
trol on the outcome of medical care, it is one method of physi-
cian discipline, and it is the primary mechanism of patient com-
pensation. While it may be inefficient, unjust, or inadequate in
all these uses, it exists at least in part because of the absence
of alternatives. It exists also because it is the only present
mechanism which takes into account the interest of the con-
sumer. Any alternative to the malpractice system must there-
fore also speak to those interests.146
Bear in mind, however, that no one can demonstrate that
a no-fault system necessarily serves as a deterrent less well than
does a fault system. In the case of workers' compensation, for
example, it is not thought that turning to no-fault payment by
employers to injured employees encouraged carelessness on the
part of employers. Indeed, the converse has been postulated. In
the words of perhaps the leading treatise on tort law by Profes-
sors Fowler Harper and Fleming James of Yale Law School:
"The question is whether the tendency to [promote safety and
reduce accidents] will be greater if the fault principle is retained,
or if the principle of [no-fault] . . . liability is substituted for
it. We believe that the tendency would be stronger under a sys-
tem of [no-fault] . . . liability.' 14 7 'n support of this conclusion,
the authors argue that forcing someone to pay for accidents re-
gardless of fault encourages safer conduct in that, as Professor
Warren Seavey has written, "If the law requires a perfect score
in result, the actor is more likely to strive for that than if the
law requires only the ordinary precautions to be taken."'
48
146. Remarks of John Ball, Conference, supra note 19.
147. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmE S, TnE LAw oF ToRTs § 12.4, at 755-56
(1956).
148. Seavey, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior," in HAIvARD
LEGAL EssAys 433, 447 (1934); cf. Arizona Employers' Liability Cases,
250 U.S. 400, 432-33 (Holmes, J., concurring). Indeed, there may well
be resistance and resentment of health care providers to no-fault liability
on the ground that it is somehow unfair to have to pay when one is
not at fault. Thus one doctor, upon hearing of the no-fault plan with
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Nor should the allegedly large amount of incompetent medi-
cine being practiced by incompetent doctors' 49 be seen as an
argument against no-fault insurance. 15 0 After all, it has never
been the case that only safer employers have been allowed cover-
age under no-fault workers' compensation. Indeed, the less safe
is a provider of goods or services or jobs, the more the need to
guarantee payment for injuries stemming from his actions. Also,
the less skillful or prudent is a provider of goods or services or
jobs, the less we probably need fear his ability to control or
manipulate his accident risks so as to unfairly arrange lesser pay-
ment under his insurance.' 51
On the other hand, notwithstanding the optimism expressed
by Harper and James, confidence that no-fault insurance will not
lessen deterrence is probably about as far as we can go-at least
for the present. Blum and Kalven suggest:
Economists have urged that the chief function of [an insur-
ance payment] . . . system is to provide incentives that will
serve to alter behavior so as to optimize accident costs in the
society.... The argument over the degree to which the deter-
rence objective offers criteria for designing [insurance-pay-
ment] ... systems has not been resolved.... [W] e are dis-
posed to hazard the guess that deterrence strategies cannot, for
both practical and political reasons, be executed through
highly differentiated insurance [mechanisms] ... 152
its elimination of payment for pain and suffering, stated: "It sounds
like the only people we're going to preserve pain and suffering for are
the doctors." Remarks of Dr. Torrey C. Brown of the Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Medical School faculty, Conference, supra note 19, in the Balti-
more Sun, Nov. 22, 1975, § B, at 2, col. 8. This view seems mistaken, but
it nevertheless indicates that payment under no-fault insurance will still
entail some emotional as well as financial penalty. Indeed, Professor
Robert Keeton suggested at the University of Maryland Conference, su-
pra note 19, that one means of avoiding any stigma attaching to no-
fault payment is to place all the patients of a health care provider
(whether doctor, hospital, or clinic) under a (floating) group insurance
contract so that payment takes on a "first party" aspect and does not
come directly from the health care provider or its insurer. Even so, the
nexus between the provision of health care services and ultimate pay-
ment will probably furnish as much deterrence as we realistically can
hope for, at least at the outset of elective no-fault insurance.
149. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 26-30, 1976, at 1.
150. Especially given the haphazard, episodic, and dilatory way mal-
practice is discovered and proven. See notes 1-3, 145-46 supra and ac-
companying text. In addition, it is common knowledge that often the
safest doctors and hospitals-who undertake the most difficult cases and
procedures-face the most malpractice suits and the highest malpractice
costs. See N.Y. Times, May 10, 1976, at 23, cols. 2-5.
151. See notes 113-14, 126-27 supra and accompanying text.
152. Blum & Kalven, Ceilings, Costs, and Compulsion in Auto Com-
pensation Legislation, 1973 UTAH L. REv. 341, 380 n.44.
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It may not be without significance that after generations of
experience, insurers are still apparently totally frustrated in try-
ing to encourage industrial safety through variations in insurance
rating techniques under workers' compensation insurance. As
Professor Patrick Atiyah has written:
The [National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation
Laws] studied the industrial accident level in States with very
different levels of workmen's compensation benefits. On the
basis of economic theory, it might have been supposed that in
states where the benefits and therefore the premiums were
higher, employers would take more care (and spend more
money) to minimize accident costs by keeping the accident lev-
els as low as possible. However, no systematic relationship was
discovered between accident levels atd benefit levels.(' 5 3] Even
when comparisons were made between states with similar in-
dustrial backgrounds there was no observable corrollation be-
tween accident levels and benefit levels. For example, Virginia,
Georgia and Alabama had similar be nefit levels but widely dif-
ferent accident levels; Pennsylvania and New Jersey had very
similar accident levels but vastly different benefits levels. The
Commission concluded that the evidence suggests that "work-
men's compensation insurance rates are not the strongest force
affecting the frequency of accidents.'[ 5 41
... Although it would be wrong to overlook altogether the
broad effect of market deterrence on accident cost ... the de-
tails of the argument seem to depend too much on forms of fine
tuning which are inappropriate to the circumstances. Thus, any
suggestion that an elaborate system, placing carefully calculated
accident costs attributable to each activity onto that activity,
would be justifiable, seems quite unacceptable. Indeed, crude
though the tort system itself may be, it is by no means certain
that other systems of distributing accident costs will be any
improvement from the point of view of [market] . . .deter-
rence. As we have seen, tort law does at least have the virtue
from this point of view that it places some accident costs on
those who cause accidents, and some on those who suffer them.
From the point of view of [market] . . . deterrence this is a
reasonable result, even though "fine tuning" might suggest a
much more elaborate way of dividing the costs. The case
against tort law, and the case for .ts replacement, do not de-
pend on considerations of these kinds.
The difficulty of calculating social costs, and evaluating
noneconomic costs and benefits, of allocating different costs to
different activities, and of assessing the effect of [market] ...
deterrence in face of a market distorted [for example] by taxa-
tion, are such that [market] . . . deterrence can usually only
operate in a rough and ready way at best .... Since the whole
exercise can only proceed on the basis of approximations and
153. Citing NATIONAL COMM'N oN STATE Womuc Nl's COMPENSATION




guesses anyhow, there is little purpose to be served in ...
[using] delicate instruments.' 55
On the question of deterrence, one involved in the struggle
to enact no-fault auto insurance has a sense of deja vu: As to
auto insurance reform, there were those who insisted that the
real problems of auto insurance were with unsafe drivers or un-
safe cars or unsafe roads or all three. The true solution to the
problem of auto insurance therefore was seen in restructuring
the system to somehow encourage greater safety (more energetic
criminal prosecution of motorists, more refined merit rating, and
more regulation of the design of the automobile, for example).
Similarly, it was often said that paying people regardless of fault
would lessen deterrence of unsafe driving. In point of fact, the
variables of achieving or encouraging traffic safety are so vast
that there is vigorous dispute about what steps to take. 5 ' No-
fault auto insurance has proved successful because its goal was
kept narrowly focused: bettering compensation, and this to be
done by simplifying the insured event through eliminating pay-
ment that had not only been based on an unmanageable crite-
rion (fault) but that had included compensation for an item with
an equally unmanageable criterion (pain and suffering). By
eliminating those two cumbersome variables, it has been possible
to use insurance dollars with vastly greater efficiency and expe-
dition to pay for actual economic losses. This had also been the
narrow focus that enabled workers' compensation to successfully
replace tort liability for industrial accidents over a half century
before.
Nevertheless, the same emphasis, not on reform of the tort
system, but on eliminating underlying causes is being urged for
medical malpractice. Testifying before Congress, Dr. Sidney M.
Wolfe, Director of the Health Research Group of Public Citizens,
an organization sponsored by Ralph Nader, stated:
[In] ... working toward resolution of the malpractice
crisis, the primary attention must be directed toward the [over-
155. P. ATIYAH, AcciDENTs, CoIrwENsATIoN AND =H LAW 550-51, 555-
56 (2d ed. 1975). But see Remarks of Clark Havighurst, Conference,
supra note 19, in Havighurst, supra note 58, 1975 DuxE L.J. at 1263-
69. For further discussions of the difficulties of achieving precise instru-
ments of market deterrence through variations in insurance rates, see
Atiyah, Accident Prevention and Variable Premium Rates for Work-Con-
nected Accidents (pts. I & II), 1975 INDus. L.J. 1, 89.
156. Witness, for example, the arguments pro and con about the effi-
cacy of federal regulation of automobile design. See R. NADER, UNsAFE
AT ANY SPEED (2d ed. 1972). But see Peltzman, The Effects of Automo-
bile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POL. Ecox. 677 (1975). For a report on
the dispute, see Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1976, at 3, cols. 3-6.
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all] health care system as the real source of the crisis....
The public is now faced with treating this expensive, wasteful,
and often lethal disease called malpractice. Shall the treatment
be symptomatic, or shall it get to the heart of the problem. Not
surprisingly, virtually all of the solutions proposed thus far
[such as no-fault insurance] avoid the central causal problems
of poor quality and the deteriorated doctor (provider) /patient
relationship and, instead, try to manipulate symptoms.15 7
But to the extent that we abandon the narrow focus that
has worked for industrial and auto accidents-to the extent that
we let ourselves (at least at this point) be distracted by attempts
primarily to encourage better or cheaper health care-we are
very unlikely to achieve what can be achieved, namely, beneficial
change in the tort system as applied to injuries in the course
of medical treatment. This is not to say we should not, in struc-
turing no-fault liability, be at all concerned about achieving
greater safety or that we should scorn separate efforts aimed at
that goal. Rather, we must keep in mind that safety is a very
distant and difficult goal compared to the immediately beneficial
results that can be gained by eliminating, wherever feasible, in-
surance payments based on fault and for pain and suffering.
Lacking any clear indication that it will lessen deterrence (and
the workers' compensation and auto no-fault experience certainly
foretell no such result), we should get on with eliminating these
counterproductive payments whenever and wherever possible.
And we should be chary of encumbering a proposal that would
accomplish this goal with controversial-and probably unwork-
able-governmentally mandated provisions designed to alter the
methods of a very learned, proud, and entrenched profession.158
157. Hearings on S. 482, S. 215 and S. 188 Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 670, 674 (1975).
158. Consider the analogy to Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs). An HMO, such as the Group Health Co-operative of Puget
Sound, is "an organization which provides comprehensive medical care,
including preventive, diagnostic, outpatient, and hospital services, to a
voluntarily enrolled consumer population in return for a fixed, prepaid
amount of money." Elwood, Restructuring the Health Delivery System:
Will the Health Maintenance Strategy Work?, in HEALTH MAINTENANCE
ORGANIZATIONS: A RECONFIGURATION OF THE HEALTH SERVICES SYSTEM 3
(1971) (University of Chicago, Center for Health Administration Stud-
ies), quoted in V. Fuchs, supra note 122, at 138. But also consider, for
example, the effect on such organizations of tight governmental regula-
tion, the supposed purpose of which is to ensure that they operate in
the public interest. (And in reading the following, one might hypothet-




In other words, perhaps we can do something about encouraging
safer and cheaper medicine, but let us not delay making changes
in the tort liability system that have worked elsewhere in order
to pursue other-much less immediately attainable-goals.
If, however, it turns out that in order to gain public ac-
ceptance, some substitute for the in terrorem role of medical mal-
practice is seen as necessary, one might turn to some form of
uninsurable "tort fines"'1 9 or mandatory deductibles'"0 in
For a time ... the general support that the HMO idea com-
manded from virtually every direction except that of the Ameri-
can Medical Association (AMA), seemed to ensure a substantial
commitment from the federal government. Only a few years
later, however, while HMOs in various forms continue to grow
in communities around the country, they no longer represent a
major element in federal health policy. Politically, they have
fallen victim not to new arguments or new evidence, but to a
mixture of perseverance among their opponents [and] overzeal-
ousness among their friends .... Out of these influences has
come internally incoherent legislation, presumably intended to
stimulate the development of prepaid plans, but in fact some-
thing of an impediment to their growth. The original purpose
of the HMO strategy, which was to create self-regulating institu-
tions and thereby minimize federal involvement, has been ut-
terly frustrated by the most elaborate regulation imposed by
Congress on any part of the health system .... While some
of these troubles may be temporary, . . . [t]hey are ... sugges-
tive, in a more general way, of the difficulties in changing an
industry as resilient and politically resourceful as medical care.
Starr, The Undelivered Health System, 42 PuB. INT., Winter 1976, at 66,
67-68.
159. As yet unenacted in any state, tort fines are, as the term implies,
a hybrid of tort and criminal law. Conceptually, a wrongdoer inflicting
injury would be "fined" an amount appropriate to his wrongdoing (and
not necessarily related to the victim's losses) with the proceeds going
to injury victims and with insurance disallowed. See A. EHRENZWEIG,
"FULL AmID" INSURANCE FOR THE TRAmFFc VIcTiV-A VOLUNTARY COMPENSA-
TION PLAN 33 (1943), also published in a slightly revised version in 43
CALIF. L. REv. 1, 41 (1955).
160. Of course, to the extent that no-fault compensable events are
not limited to "avoidable" consequences, see notes 58-59 supra and ac-
companying text, the occasions for physician pay-out will be highly for-
tuitous and not so much within the control of the physician. If that is so,
why use deductibles? But even if compensable events were limited to
avoidable consequences, I would leave the question of deductibles to the
market, at least initially. Picking the right level of deductible that
would sufficiently "punish" the doctor and yet do so "fairly" would be
awesomely tricky business. Query whether government officials, either
legislators or administrators, can pick the right figure for various spe-
cialties and procedures and keep them current.
Keep in mind, too, the problems created by deductibles under con-
ventional liability insurance. If the deductible is large enough to "jolt"
the insured, he will be tempted to veto any settlement, especially if he
carries a large amount of coverage above the deductible. After all, set-
tlement means certain liability, while litigation means at least a chance
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order to chastise the health care provider who "causes" compen-
sable events.1 1 My only point is that working out such impos-
ingly innovative devices is fraught with perils, and we should
do so only as a last resort.
of avoiding payment and, even if the litigation is lost, no respon-
sibility on the part of the insured for payment above the deductible
amount. This is really the mirror image of the situation-about which
there has been much writing and even litigation-where an insurer has
written low limits on an insured. In that situation, the insurer may be
inclined to refuse settlement on the ground that settlement means cer-
tain payment, while litigation means at least a chance of avoiding
payment and no responsibility for payrment beyond the policy limits. R.
KEETON, IWSURAcE LAW-BASIC TEXT § 7.8 (1971). Also, to the extent
that physician resistance to insurer settlement is now a problem, see J.
O'CoNNEmL, supra note 17, at 17, 29, 40, even though the insurer pays
the whole settlement under present medical malpractice insurance, doc-
tors' reaction might well be exacerbatel under a system requiring them
actually to pay some of the settlement. If the amount of the deductible
were very substantial (which it would have to be in order to serve as a
deterrent), one could not expect health care providers to be bound by
the insurer's decision to settle. It would be anomalous that while under
the present system, supposedly premised on genuine fault, there is no
requirement that health care providers bear a portion of payment, under
a system not turning on fault there would be.
All this might be avoided by requirements, for example, that in-
sureds bear all or a portion of litigation expenses when they veto an in-
surer's decision to settle; but structuring such arrangements would still
be very tricky. Better, perhaps, to let the parties do it, if at all, by volun-
tary arrangements than by inflexible fiat from governmental officials,
whether legislative or administrative.
161. It is very significant, is it not, that so few criminal prosecu-
tions are pressed against doctors arising out of malpractice or
against businessmen arising from defective products. This would
seem to indicate very few heinous acts, would it not, since a
"butchering" doctor or brutal manufacturer would be an attrac-
tive target for a district attorney. Perhaps even more significant
is how relatively rare are claims-and a fortiori successful
claims-against doctors for punitive damages in civil cases for
personal injury. That, too, tells us a great deal about how rela-
tively rare are heinous acts by health care providers or business-
men....
O'Connell, No-Fault Liability by Contract for Doctors, Manufacturers,
Retailers and Others, 1975 INs. L.J. 531, 536.
One might delineate certain acts-such as operating on the wrong
side or the wrong organ-for which tort exemptions could never be
gained. But, of course, the longer such a list becomes the shorter will
be the list for which prompt no-fault benefits can be paid. Nor should
one attempt to divide the line for no-fault purposes between ordinary
negligence (which could be the subject of no-fault benefits with a cor-
responding tort exemption) and gross negligence (for which a tort action
always remains possible). Such a line will simply escalate the level
and bitterness of accusation-as has happened, for example, under auto-
mobile guest statutes, where an accusation of gross negligence becomes
a prerequisite to payment. See J. O'CoNNE=, supra note 17, at 154-
55; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW O: TORTS 186-87 (4th ed. 1971).
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VI. FURTHER RESEARCH FOR IMPLEMENTING
ELECTIVE NO-FAULT
What further research is necessary as a prelude to institut-
ing elective no-fault insurance (either by statute or contract)?
Initially, still using medical maloccurrences for purposes of illus-
tration, funds might be obtained to finance meetings involving
doctors in various specialties, hospital officials, lawyers, in-
surance executives, underwriters and actuaries, and possibly rep-
resentatives of the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners to formulate usable and representative lists of compen-
sable events for various medical specialties and hospitals. Once
such lists are compiled, it will be necessary to determine the ef-
fect that paying for such events will have on insurance costs.
That, in turn, must be done by researching the effect of such
payment on the costs of claims (average claim cost) and on the
number of claims (claim frequency). As to average claim cost,
it must be determined what savings are effected by not paying
for (1) legal and insurance expenses incurred in determining
fault and the monetary value of pain and suffering, (2) pain and
suffering itself, and (3) amounts already paid by other sources,
such as Blue Cross and sick leave. As to claim frequency, it
must be determined how many more claims must be paid once
claims are paid regardless of whether the health care provider
can be proven negligent.
Such studies could be done either hypothetically or by ac-
tually paying certain numbers of claims on a no-fault basis. A
hypothetical study could be done either retrospectively or pro-
spectively. If done retrospectively, closed claim files of insureds
and insurers should be examined to determine the effect that
no-fault payment would have had on average claim cost and
claim frequency. Medical data should be used to estimate what
the effect of no-fault payment on claim frequency would have
been. Since insurance payment has been based on common-law
tort criteria, existing records will by no means reveal all the
claims that would be eligible for payment once common-law tort
liability criteria are abandoned. But medical data are often
available to ascertain the number of adverse results from given
medical procedures, regardless of whether the adverse results are
negligently induced. A prospective study, on the other hand,
would begin with study of claim files as they are closed to deter-
mine the relevant data and with similar supplementary use of
medical data to determine the effect of no-fault payment on claim
frequency. A possible disadvantage of a retrospective study is
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that the available data may not have been collected in the most
suitable form. Such a defect poses no problem for a prospective
study since one can define at the outset what data to collect. But
a corresponding disadvantage of a prospective study is the delay
in waiting for claims to be closed. Of course, it might prove
possible to combine these methods to supplement and cross-check
each other.
As to hypothetical versus factual studies, hypothetical stud-
ies have, by definition, an unreal quality about them. Actual
payments on a no-fault basis might be somewhat different from
hypothetical predictions as to what payment of such claims might
entail. But, of course, an experiment in actually paying claims
on a no-fault basis is a much more ambitious undertaking than
a hypothetical study. On the other hand, it is by no means un-
feasible. Cooperating hospitals, for example, might well be will-
ing to experiment with actually contracting to pay on a no-fault
basis for certain adverse results of in-house surgery or other acci-
dents. Whoever funds such no-fault research may need to pro-
vide an additional subsidy to cover unexpectedly large losses.
But with or without a subsidy, a "stop loss" provision'6 2 could
ensure that only a committed amount was exposed in the ex-
periment.
Whichever of these research methods is adopted, measures
should begin immediately for expediting experimentation by sim-
plifying the insured event for medical maloccurrences. Such
simplification can best be achieved by implementing, wherever
feasible, guaranteed but limited payment for predictably adverse
results as a replacement for the present "roulette" system of
medical malpractice compensation under which injured patients
are forced to pursue the remote possibility of a relatively huge
settlement or verdict.
VII. DISABILITY INSURANCE AS AN ALTERNATIVE
TO INSURANCE FOR DEFINED COMPENSABLE
EVENTS
It may turn out that the device of listing compensable events
under elective no-fault insurance for medical injuries will prove
too difficult to arrange (depending, as it does, on the intense co-
operation and coordination of doctors, lawyers, insurers, and in-
162. A "stop loss" provision is designed to cut off exposure to losses
at a certain point. In this case, once loss reserves of a given amount
are committed, no further no-fault contracts would be offered.
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sureds) or execute (in that adverse results may not be easily
isolatable, e.g., cardiac arrest can lead to brain damage-would
the latter be included under cardiac arrest as an adverse result?).
An alternative-and arguably simpler device-might be
worth considering, especially (but not exclusively) for hospitals.
Under this proposal, a health care provider would agree in ad-
vance of surgery to provide disability insurance covering further
medical expense and wage loss (up to $200 per week) once any
other health insurance or sick leave applicable to the patient had
been exhausted. Such insurance would cover any disability com-
mencing within a certain number of hours or days after surgery
(the precise time to be determined in the insurance policy). In
return for every one dollar of disability coverage, the health care
provider would contract with the patient for a corresponding ex-
emption from medical malpractice liability. In other words, if
the health care provider contracted with the patient to provide,
say, $10,000 of disability insurance, such provider might secure
an exemption for medical malpractice liability up to $20,000 of
tort liability damages. The particular multiple would turn on
how much disability insurance could be purchased from the sav-
ings that would result if malpractice insurance premiums were
calculated on the basis of this tort exemption. It might turn
out to be on a ratio of 1:1 or 1:2 or, on the other hand, even
higher, because of the large number of claims that might have
to be paid under such disability insurance. In light of the rela-
tively remote chance that any given patient would ever be paid
from medical malpractice insurance and the long delay in pay-
ment if made,'6 3 the exchange might appeal to most patients
at almost any ratio.
That the new coverage is disability insurance-covering any
disability leading to further medical expense or wage loss-would
dispense with problems of exhaustively defining adverse results
from particular medical procedures. Litigation over whether a
particular adverse result was, in fact, within the scope of the
definition would also be avoided. Note that payment under such
disability insurance could be defined to commence only after the
normal recuperative period-also defined in the policy-for the
particular medical procedure. 64
If it turns out that providing coverage for wage loss as -well
as for the cost of further medical care is too expensive, the disa-
163. See text accompanynig note 32 supra.
164. See generally note 118 supra and accompanying text.
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bility insurance contract could be -written to cover only medical
care costs. And since medical care is furnished in kind by the
health care provider, this coverage might be much less expensive.
Here, too, because of the uncertainty and delays of payment
under traditional medical malpractice insurance, most patients
would probably readily agree to substitute certain payment for
needed medical care for an uncertain claim for tort damages.
Furthermore, the advantages of greater assurance of pay-
ment are so undeniable that even if the costs of such disability
insurance turn out to be so much greater than tort liability insur-
ance that health care providers cannot offer it as a substitute
(even without including wage loss), they might nonetheless offer
it to patients for an additional charge. Such an arrangement
might still be advantageous to the patient, since he would not
bear the full cost of the coverage. The health care provider
would pay the premium to the extent of his savings from the
lower malpractice insurance rates attributable to the tort exemp-
tion feature of disability insurance.
As a further inducement to lower costs, the tort exemption
could be based on a sliding scale. Thus when the health care
provider offers disability benefits of a very substantial amount
(such as $200,000), a total tort exemption might be secured in
return.165 Moreover, a total exemption might be justified for
even much lower disability benefits ($50,000 or less), depending
on comparative tort and disability insurance costs.
Note that health care providers would not be obliged to offer
such disability insurance to all patients. Aged patients or others
particularly susceptible to adverse surgical results might be ex-
cluded. Furthermore, no patient would be required to accept the
substitution of disability insurance for medical malpractice liabil-
ity. And such disability insurance need not cover death benefits.
Finally, as with the proposal for elective no-fault medical
malpractice insurance, a stop loss device could be employed to
ensure that only a predetermined amount of the insurers' re-
sources were exposed in an experiment with disability insurance.
VIII. ELECTIVE NO-FAULT REFORM IN BROAD
PERSPECTIVE
Recently, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, in urging favorable con-
sideration of elective no-fault insurance, called no-fault auto in-
surance "the one incontestably successful reform [proposed in]
165. See O'Connell, supra note 76, at: 281.
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. . . the 1960's."' 66  It is significant that the principal dispute
as to no-fault auto insurance for personal injury concerns
whether and how it is to be extended beyond the states where
it has been enacted. 167 No state in which it has been enacted
is seriously considering abandoning it, but every state that does
not have it is debating whether to adopt it. Even more signifi-
cantly perhaps, after more than 50 years of experience with no-
166. Moynihan, Foreword to J. O'CoNNEL, supra note 17, at xi. See
note 99 supra and accompanying text.
167. Auto no-fault laws that wipe out tort suits (so-called "true"
no-fault laws as opposed to "spurious" ones; for a discussion of the dis-
tinction, see J. O'CONNELL, supra note 17, at 24 n.4) have meant genuine
-and arguably dramatic-improvement in law and insurance applicable
to personal injury resulting from auto accidents. For favorable reports
on no-fault as applied to personal injury in New York, Connecticut, and
New Jersey, see N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1975, § E (News of the Week), at
6, cols. 4-8. There may be a need to increase the tort threshold (below
which claims based on fault cannot be pursued) because of rising costs
for auto insurance in New York State. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1975,
§ E (News of the Week), at 5. See also id., Jan. 24, 1976, at 1, cols.
1-3; id., Jan. 25, 1976, at 1, cols. 5-7. As to Massachusetts, Benjamin
Taylor of the Boston Globe staff writes: "It was hoped the law would
root out phony claims and eliminate costly legal fees thereby halting
the rapid rise of insurance rates for bodily injury coverage which oc-
curred during the late 1960s. As John O'Connor, a spokesman for the
insurance industry, said 'It worked beyond anyone's wildest dreams."'
Boston Sunday Globe, Oct. 12, 1975, at 37, col. 4. For favorable reports
on no-fault in Minnesota, see St. Paul Dispatch, Sept. 25, 1975, at 33,
cols. 3-6; and Minneapolis Star, Sept. 25, 1975, § B, at 8, col. 1. For
a more documented appraisal of the success of no-fault as applied to
personal injury, see Hearings, supra note 99, at 402-34 (testimony of Rob-
ert Keeton). For an appraisal of no-fault auto insurance as on the whole
successful, though plagued by, among other things, inflation and the
elimination of too few tort suits by low tort thresholds, see Wall St.
J., Jan. 21, 1976, at 1, col. 6.
Admittedly, as Professor Keeton points out, "the possibilities for im-
provement of the [auto insurance] system [as applied to car damage]
... are very modest in comparison with the dramatic improvements af-
fected by a real no-fault system for injuries to people." Hearings, supra
note 99, at 676. This is largely because the savings of eliminating pay-
ment for pain and suffering and lawyers' fees are not applicable (since
car damage cases are often arbitrated inexpensively and expeditiously
between insurance companies). Indeed, most of the public dissatisfaction
with the operation of no-fault insurance has stemmed from its applica-
tion to property damage. See Boston Sunday Globe, Oct. 12, 1975, at
37, cols. 2-5. In Michigan, see note 37 supra and accompanying text,
and in Florida, Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), the property
damage provisions of the no-fault laws have been ruled unconstitutional.
For two scholarly empirical studies reporting favorably on the ex-
perience under no-fault laws in Florida and Massachusetts, see Little,
No-Fault Auto Reparation in Florida: An Empirical Examination of
Some of Its Effects, 9 U. Mic. J.L. REFomvt 1 (1975); Widiss, Accident
Victims Under No-Fault Automobile Insurance: A Massachusetts Survey,
61 IowA L. REv. 1 (1975).
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fault workers' compensation, none of the 50 states that have
adopted it has ever seriously considered voluntarily abandoning
it.168 Moynihan has attempted to place elective no-fault liabil-
ity in a broad socio-political context. He cites the rise in distrust
of business and professionals, as wel as government, exemplified
in the increasing aggressiveness-but concomitant futility-of
the consumer movement: 169
There is an element ... in the new consumerism which is not
reassuring at all .... I fear that; American education is in-
168. According to the National Commission on State Workmen's
Compensation Laws:
We have discussed the implications of abolishing workmen's
compensation and reverting to . . . negligence suits, a remedy
abandoned some fifty years ago. This option is still inferior to
workmen's compensation.... [Tort] liability suits [are] a
drawn-out, costly and uncertain process that was dismissed long
ago as a means of dealing with occupational injuries and dis-
eases.
NATIONAL CoVM'N ON STATE WoRKmEN's COMPENSATION LAWS, REPORT
25, 45 (1972).
The ironic thing about criticism of auto no-fault is that, in large
measure, it has stemmed from four associations-two insurance associa-
tions (the American Mutual Insurance Alliance and the National Associa-
tion of Independent Insurers) and two lawyer associations (for the plain-
tiffs, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, and for the defendants,
the Defense Research Institute). See Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1976, at 1, col. 6.
And it is precisely these groups that have labored energetically-and in
large measure successfully-to see to it that any no-fault law is crippled
by a low tort "threshold," with the result that relatively few claims
based on fault are eliminated. Thus, insurers must stand ready in far
too many cases to respond to both no-fault and fault-based claims. Hav-
ing labored to see to it such no-fault laws are passed, these organizations
and their members then point to such emasculated laws as proof that
no-fault laws don't work as well as their genuine supporters promised.
But those genuine supporters urged-and are urging-an elimination of
all but the most serious claims based on fault (for example where dam-
ages for pain and suffering exceed $5000 or where total disability exceeds
90 days), while the insurers and trial lawyers mentioned above have seen
to it that tort thresholds, where enacted at all, allow claims based on
fault to be brought whenever medical expenses exceed amounts as low as
$500. See J. O'CoNNELL, supra note 17, at 24-25, nn. 4, 5, 6, 12. See also
J. O'CoNNELL, THE INURY INDusTRY Am' THE REMEDY OF No-FAULT IN-
SURANCE 110-21 (1971). Indeed, these same insurers and trial law-
yers advocate no-fault plans that mamdate no elimination of tort
claims whatsoever. But simply adding on no-fault coverage with-
out ensuring the elimination of any claims based on fault would
seem to raise inevitable risks of much higher costs. For discussion of
this approach, see Hearings, supra note 99, at 691-712 (testimony of Rob-
ert Keeton and Craig Spangenberg); .T. O'CoNNELL & R. HENDERSON,
TORT LAw, No-FAULT AND BEYOND: TEACHING MATERIuS ON COMPENSA-
TION FOR AccIDENTS AND AILMENTS IN MODERN SOcIETY 306-07 (1975).
169. "It may be possible to make a strong case against either markets
or [governmental] administration systems, but if we are against both we




creasingly turning out persons of socially active dispositions
who do not understand or accept how the American economic
system works and that this is going to have the most baleful
consequences for that system. It is going to become overreg-
ulated and oversued, undercapitalized and underproductive.170
Writes Moynihan:
Distrust grows-or is alleged to grow-practically in propor-
tion to the measures taken to allay it. Hence, the latest news
from Washington is that an enlightened Republican senator, in
the course of the debate over the Consumer Protection Agency,
has asked who is going to represent the consumer before the
agency designed to represent the consumer before the agencies
designed to represent the consumer. Literally, I quote:
OMBUDSMAN FOR CONSUMERS: Senator Taft has
filed an amendment to the Consumer Protection Bill,
now before the Senate, which would create an "om-
budsman Agency" to oversee activities of a new Agency
for Consumer Advocacy proposed by the Bill. Taft
fears the ACA would become "an irresponsible and
unrestrained super-agency, speaking only for a few,
more vocal interest groups" while ignoring the real in-
terest of the consuming public.
One recalls a pressing issue from the McCarthy days, formu-
lated, as I recall, by Zero Mostel: "Who's going to investigate
the man who investigates the man who investigates me?"171
"It is here," asserts Moynihan, "that [elective no-fault liabil-
ity insurance] . . . assumes an almost unique importance, for
while modest seeming, it addresses the largest of questions."'
1 7 2
Since elective no-fault insurance for products and services
is self-executing, without the need for a new and cumbersome
bureaucracy, such as those ordained by PSROs, it is, for Moyni-
han, a prototype of the kind of innovative, pragmatic, coopera-
tive, and mutually beneficial reform that is essential to our soci-
ety. It is, he writes,
conservative ... in the sense that Justice Frankfurter was con-
servative. [It] ... values highly those things the legal system
can do, and . . .is concerned that [the legal system] . . .not
seek to overdo. An overextended system, dealing with ever
more peripheral issues, eventually becomes incapable of dealing
with those vital and central issues for which it was created.
The image of empires collapsing on their marches comes to
mind. [The proponents of elective no-fault liability do] .. .
not want us litigating ourselves into a stalemated and paranoid
society. We could do so. We could take all the fun out of it,
all the pride out of it, and that would be such a waste, such a
loss. [Not long ago] ... a Congressional study on medical
malpractice [was] subtitled 'The Patient Versus the Physician.!
170. Moynihan, supra note 166, at xviii-xix.
171. Id. at xvi.
172. Id. at xviii.
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This is a relation [we do] . . . not want. It won't help doctors
and it won't help patients. Similar confrontational, adversary
relations are developing seemingly everywhere. They can't
succeed. When everyone sues, no one gets satisfied. (Our ex-
perience with the automobile brought us after the fact to that
realization.) . . . The legal system becomes ever more encum-
bered.... Justice ... is not done.... Free systems come
more and more to be seen as threatening; regulation ever more
normal and necessary. Thereafter regulation of the regulators.
And thence regulation of the regulators of the regulators. This
is the way systems die.173
Earlier, Moynihan, in discussing the advantages of no-fault
auto insurance, had stated that the proponents of no-fault insur-
ance "are right in the all-important perception as to what it is
Americans are good at. We are good at maintaining business
relationships once a basis of mutual self-interest is established.
[No-fault insurance] . . . would establish one." 174 Elective no-
fault insurance allows doctors and their patients and manufac-
turers and their customers to bypass both lawyers and bureau-
crats, with all their self-serving cumbersomeness, in dealing with
accidental injuries suffered in the course of medical treatment
or from defective products. It too, then is an excellent example
of establishing a relationship based on mutual self-interest. As
such, writes Moynihan, it is not "merely. . . concerned with as-
pects of tort liability [; it is concerned with] . . . those partic-
ulars whereby a free society remains free."175
Professor Luke Cooperrider also has discerned the essence
of elective no-fault insurance. In identifying the practical conse-
quences of adopting such a system, he, too, comments percep-
tively on the ramifications for American social policy:
The tort system is strongly condemned, not only because it
treats accident victims badly, but also because in the process it
dissipates the resources that could otherwise provide more ade-
quately for their needs. It could be argued that it is arraigned
for not doing what it was never designed to do. Tort law is a
system of conflict resolution, by nature contentious. It is diffi-
cult to see how it could be otherwise, or how it could come to
be thought of as a likely machine for the efficient treatment of
massive social problems. However that argument would beg the
question. If it makes sense, for either compassionate or eco-
nomic reasons, for society to replace the economic losses of all
those who become the fortuitous victims of a technological envi-
ronment-and it can scarcely be denied that this reflects the
trend of the times even in tort litigation-then it surely makes
sense to seek a more efficient way o2 doing it than the tort sys-
173. Id. at xix-xx.
174. Moynihan, Next: A New Auto Insurance Policy, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 27, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 26.
175. Moynihan, supra note 166, at xx.
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tem provides. It makes sense to try to put it on an insurance
basis rather than a litigation basis. If. . . a comprehensive so-
cial insurance system that would provide not only for medical
care, but also for income maintenance, is not for us in the fore-
seeable future, then one must look to the private sector. There
one finds that a significant part of the problem is already treated
on a first party basis through medical insurance and service con-
tracts, various employment related fringe benefits, and some
public benefit systems. The problem is to provide a supple-
mentary plan to replace economic losses not absorbed by these
systems for those persons to whom they apply, and also to bring
the less well connected members of society under the umbrella.
The most immediate access to this part of the problem seems
to lie through the liability system, as there is no other obvious
way of bringing in from the cold those who do not presently
enjoy the benefits provided by our conglomeration of private
sector medical expense and income protection devices-which is
what the automobile no-fault statutes, in their limited way, have
accomplished in respect to the injuries to which they apply. The
solution proposed here for other categories of accidental injury
is by no means so neat as that which was possible in respect
to automobile accidents, but that is due to the intractability of
the subject matter. 176
In sum, elective no-fault insurance does provide the only
practicable means of immediately "bringing in from the cold"
many of those whose losses from accidents outstrip their collat-
eral resources.
We should get on with that task.
176. Cooperrider, Book Review, 22 WAYxE L. RFv. 189, 194-95 (1975)
(reviewing J. O'CoNNELL, supra note 17).
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